The World Faces a Highly Variable Inflation Outlook

The inflation spike of the past two years has been the worst since the 1970s. Back then, its persistence caused central banks to tighten monetary policy for extended periods, fueling bouts of asset price volatility. In response, many countries introduced reforms designed to make future inflation surges easier to bring down. Did these reforms work—or could we be facing a repeat of 1970s‑style persistent inflation? 

The reforms introduced following the experience of the 1970s included changes to product market regulations to foster more price competition for goods and services, monetary reforms that granted independence to central banks and set inflation as the sole target for monetary policy, and measures to encourage greater labour market participation and reduce second‑round wage inflation. The current bout of inflation is the biggest test these reforms have faced since their introduction.  

To test how well they are likely to stand up to the challenge, we studied 89 inflation surges across 40 countries from 1970–2019. Our aim was to better understand which economic factors raise the risk of second‑round effects and greater inflation persistence. We define an inflation surge as an episode in which inflation is at least double its five‑year average value in a particular country.  

Our analysis shows that countries that adopted inflation targeting, deregulated labour and product markets, and had both high unemployment relative to history and high labour force participation relative to trend rates saw inflation return to previous long‑term averages within 16–22 months. Countries that did not adopt these measures, and that had low unemployment and low labour force participation rates, were more likely to see inflation persist over a longer period (Figure 1).  

What does this imply for the path of inflation in different countries today? We ranked countries and regions across four factors: labour market regulation, product market regulation, labour demand, and labour supply (Figure 2). We found that the Nordic and eurozone regions are the least likely to experience persistent above‑target inflation because of strong labour supply (i.e., high labour force participation). Japan, the US, and the UK are more likely to experience above‑target inflation because of low labour force participation relative to trend. Emerging markets are most at risk of persistent inflation as these countries tend to have highly regulated product and labour markets in addition to labour market imbalances. Latin America, a region with a history of hyperinflation, has the highest risks of inflation persistence, according to our analysis. These results also hold true when Argentina is excluded, a country where year‑on‑year inflation was more than 100% in March. 

These differences in expected inflation persistence will have consequences for monetary policies in these countries and regions. The Nordic area and eurozone, for example, should be able to cut policy rates earlier than other developed markets. In emerging markets, monetary policy may have to remain restrictive for longer to get inflation back under control.  

Over the past year, bonds have sold off significantly in response to the inflation surge across the world. Our analysis suggests that inflation will be least persistent in the Nordic countries and the eurozone. This means that long‑term bonds in these regions are likely to experience the largest rally, since central banks there would likely be able to cut policy rates faster. Sovereign bonds of these countries with the most favourable inflation dynamics could potentially provide a better medium‑term real (inflation‑adjusted) yield return and also offer the potential for a larger capital gain. Conversely, inflation‑linked bonds could act as insurance against higher inflation in those developed markets more likely to experience persistent inflation, such as the UK. 

In those emerging markets with the highest risk of high inflation persistence, our preference is hard currency‑denominated bonds. Several of these countries also face significant fiscal policy challenges and sometimes populist governments. In those countries, there is a risk of fiscal dominance, which means that central banks will likely be pressured to not hike interest rates to the levels necessary to return inflation back to their targets in the medium term. In these circumstances, local currency bonds are likely to underperform, which is why we prefer hard currency bonds instead.