Is the End of the Expansion in Sight?

Nikolaj Schmidt , Chief International Economist



Yield curves typically flatten when a central bank tightens monetary policy, so in that sense, the recent flattening has been quite normal. The important question now is: Is the Fed able or willing to do anything about it?

So far, the Fed’s operating principle has been ‘behind the curve is ahead of the curve’: it has deliberately been slow to tighten to allow the economy to gain sufficient momentum before reducing monetary stimulus.


The risk of this approach is that the labor market overheats to an extent that a recession is required to rein in wage pressures. At the moment there’s not much evidence of rampant wage demands, but U.S. unemployment is very low, and that will eventually put upward pressure on pay.

Ultimately, the Fed’s choice comes down to either controlling inflation or managing the yield curve—and the Fed will always choose to focus on inflation. My sense, however, is that it is slightly behind the curve and will struggle to deliver a smooth slowdown.


In sight? Yes. In near sight? No. I think expansion will end in around two years’ time or shortly after. While we’re clearly in the latter stage of the business cycle, the end of the expansion is not imminent.

The U.S. administration has launched a procyclical fiscal expansion, and this should support growth through to 2019. China seems to have learned its lesson following the currency devaluation debacle in 2015, and I expect the authorities will do whatever they must to ensure growth does not slow too rapidly. Europe has slowed, but I see this as a moderation in the data rather than a meaningful downturn—parts of the continent are still in the early stages of recovery, and monetary policy remains fairly loose.

The bell usually rings for the final stage of an expansion when there is significant wage inflation. While the low unemployment rate has sown the seeds of wage inflation, I don’t believe we’re there yet.


President Trump’s approach to negotiations seem to follow the principles he laid out in his book ‘The Art of the Deal’: Begin by punching your opponent in order to gain leverage. This is exemplified by his threats to withdraw from NAFTA, his proposed tariffs on trade with China, the steel and aluminum tariffs (that were later rolled back for the most significant trade partners), etc. At the same time, Beijing’s ‘Made in China 2025’ agenda (to dominate a large number of global industries through superior technology) seems to have rung alarm bells across Capitol Hill. Putting its longer-term strategic objectives so bluntly may have been a bit of a policy mistake by China—‘Made in China 2025’ sounds like an industrial declaration of war, and nobody in the U.S. is going to like that.

Although the U.S. and China have drawn firm battle lines, it’s possible this is mostly posturing and they will eventually agree to a mutually beneficial trade deal. While it may help Trump to look tough on China ahead of the U.S. midterm elections, it will be even more beneficial to agree a deal in time for the next U.S. presidential election in 2020.



A rise in oil prices can be regarded as a redistribution of wealth from oil consumers to oil producers. This is important because the eurozone, Japan, and China are large oil importers for whom any price increase will be a headwind. On the other hand, Middle Eastern countries, Russia, and Colombia are net oil producers and will benefit from a price increase in the form of stronger external balances.

Historically, recessions have often coincided with meaningful increases in oil prices, but the structure of the U.S. economy has changed meaningfully over the past years: The U.S. has shifted from being a very large oil importer to having a roughly balanced oil account. Today, the impact of rising oil prices in the U.S. is more about redistribution from consumers to producers than a direct transfer from the U.S. to the rest of the world. However, this redistribution across sectors can also be disruptive, as we saw in 2015.




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