November 2026, In the Spotlight
In this episode of The Angle from T. Rowe Price, Justin Thomson, head of the T. Rowe Price Investment Institute, sits down with technology analyst Benedict Evans to explore today’s AI investment boom, why it matters for investors, and why it matters now. We find out why AI today looks a lot like the late 1990s, why adoption is wide but shallow, and why, unlike the fiber build-out of the dot-com bubble, AI capacity is being built behind demand. Benedict Evans also discusses the challenge of deploying capital at this scale, where future demand for AI may come from, and why a shift from information asymmetry to imagination asymmetry means asking better questions may matter more than ever.
Podcast Host
Speakers
Benedict Evans
Independent Technology analyst
“The Angle” Music
Cold OPEN: “And he said that he thought there was a shift from information asymmetry to imagination asymmetry. And what he meant by that was you have to have the imagination to know what to ask.”
Justin Thomson
Welcome to The Angle from T. Rowe Price, a podcast for curious investors. Just a reminder that outside of the U.S. and Australia, this podcast is for investment professionals only. Thank you for joining me today, I'm Justin Thomson, head of the T. Rowe Price Investment Institute.
My guest today is technology analyst Benedict Evans. Benedict has seen various technology waves at close hand in a 25-year career on the sell-side as a strategist in the telco industry, and as a partner in venture capital. As we talk about today's AI investment boom, we are going to explore why this matters for investors and why this matters now.
Benedict, welcome.
Benedict Evans
Thank you.
Justin Thomson
Let's start with you. What motivates Benedict Evans?
Benedict Evans
Boredom and curiosity, I suppose. I think as a general answer, I did my degree in history, which is: read a lot and try and work out what you can say that's interesting and different, and that's what analysis is. In technology, the point that you understand something is generally the point you should be looking for a different question. And so, you kind of have to keep moving and asking, well what's the next thing? What's the next puzzle? And so, it's kind of nice to have some new puzzles to talk about.
Justin Thomson
Interesting, because part of our branding is all about curiosity and ask better questions, get better answers. But I've also noticed in that, that you have a low boredom threshold, so I hope I don't bore you! There is a saying, this is totally different, just like the last time. So, I know every technology wave has its differences, but what period in history you can allude to recent waves of technology, or you can go back to railways, canals, is the closest analog to where we are today?
Benedict Evans
I think from a technology, rather than a financial point of view, AI today looks a lot like the late 90s, in that this is very exciting and it's clear it's going to change everything. And you have people getting into a sort of state of euphoria, that the entire world is going to look completely different in like three weeks. And you have 25-year-olds who never really done anything except work in computer science and work for a tech company, who suddenly imagine that they understand the whole of the rest of the world, and know exactly how everything's going to work in places that they've never been and things they've never seen. You, within the technology, I get work. It's amazing and exciting and it's clearly, it's the next big thing, but a lot of it doesn't really work. It just kind of, sort of works, yet. And it's not clear, what the actual strategic building blocks are going to be.
So, you know, go back to the mid/late 90s. Mark Zuckerberg is in middle school, Larry and Sergey are students. Mark. Jeff Bezos is a bookseller with a bad haircut and a goofy grin and no muscles. And it wasn't clear that AOL and Yahoo were going to disappear off the face of the earth, and that there was going to be this thing called social. It wasn't clear how any of it would work, and I think that's kind of where we are now. It's very exciting. It's not clear how any of this is going to work.
The obvious way that this is different, I mean, there's probably maybe two ways that this is different. One of them is that it looks like this happens much faster, which I'm not, I think is slightly deceptive. The cloud is already there. The data is already there. ChatGPT from a consumer perspective is just a website. So, of course you can get hundreds of millions of people using it straight away. I mean, it's an unfair comparison, but it's kind of irrelevant comparison. However, it actually is taking a lot longer than that to get to real usage. So, you've got very wide adoption, but very shallow adoption. Every company has deployed (Microsoft) Copilot, but that doesn't result in, like, wide-scale automation or changes in how anybody does things. So, it looks much faster superficially than it really is.
I think the other fundamental way that this is different from the dot-com bubble, or indeed other things like the growth of mobile, and remember, mobile didn't come with a bubble, or the mobile bubble was in 2000 and then mobile actually happened in 2010. But, the other way that this is different from, like PCs, or the internet, or mobile is that with those we didn't know exactly how they were going to work, but we knew what the physical limits were. Whereas with this, we don't actually understand the science of AI really. We don't know why these models produce such good results. So, there's a sort of ‘unfundamental’ uncertainty in how this will evolve that wasn't the case with previous platform shifts.
Justin Thomson
I think that moves us on nicely to talk about the technology. And I don't know whether you were requoting someone, but you quoted that a frontier LLM (Large Language Model) is the most expensive and fastest depreciating asset ever created, which would call into question the economics. I actually think that you think it's more nuanced than that, but let's talk a little bit about the economics of the model here.
Benedict Evans
Yeah, this is another of these. Is it the same? Or is it different? And there's a certain kind of person that loves to talk about fiber here. Where we had obviously; we had this huge over-deployment of fiber in the dot-com bubble. It's not, it's not, it's not like that in the sense that; that was built out way ahead of demand, whereas this is being built out way behind demand, which is really kind of important to understand.
Justin Thomson
Did we know that ex-ante.
Benedict Evans
Yes. We well; you can argue about this. So, there were these claims about how fast the demand was growing that turned out not to be really true. But I think clearly today we have massively more demand than we have supply. I think the challenge here is, like, it's kind of, I mean, the advantage of the fiber comparison is you've got so many unknowns in trying to forecast this. So, you can kind of try and model out; okay, this is how much data center is going to get built in the next couple of years. How much is going to get lit up with power? What chips are going to go into them? What the token per watt is for doing that? And therefore, you can pick a number of how much kind of underlying fundamental capacity is going to expand. And, you know, you can pick a number: 50x, 100x, 200x; whatever the number is. Then you know that, we've only really got product market fit for one thing, which is software development. And then there's got a, then new a few other things around the edges of that but are much smaller. We do not have broad consumer product market fit. We don't have, like a thing, like Instagram that hundreds of millions of people are using a lot every day to do with LLMs.
So, we've got this explosive demand, which looks like it's at $50 or $100 billion run-rate revenue just for the two model labs. So, it's not unreasonable to say, well, yeah, you could have way, way, way more demand quite quickly if you had other things start working. And so, you don't really know how much more capacity we're going to get. You don't really know how much more the demand is going to grow. It's plausible that you could have demand ahead of supply for quite a long time in investment terms for like multiple years, going out outside of the framework of capital markets or the business dynamics.
Justin Thomson
Forgive me, but I'm going to pin you against a wall.
Benedict Evans
That wasn't the metaphor I first thought of, but.
Justin Thomson
So, we talk a lot about scaling laws. And by that, in frontier models that the capability and performance of the model rises in proportion to the investment in the compute. Is there any physical, or indeed practical limitation to those scaling laws?
Benedict Evans
I can give you a really, really short answer. We don't know.
Justin Thomson
But I'm pinning you against the wall.
Benedict Evans
We don't know. I mean, this is a thing. So, you can hypothesize some practical limits. So, you can say, well, at a certain point you run out of training data. And that's kind of a jagged statement in that there are some fields where training data, there's much more training data. It's much easier to get where synthetic data works. So other fields where it maybe doesn't. So, like it's much easier to do synthetic data in coding than in writing, for example, or in video, say, than in writing. Some of the approach in the last couple of years has been shifting from just more training data to having the model think longer, which is reasoning, and then having lots of models, which is a sort of agent swarm thing that's happened in the last six months. So, there are things that you can do that can expand the capability, without more, without scaling more.
So, I mean, for the sake of argument, if you were to say, well, presuming the model stopped, had stopped in January, you could have still taken the model progress that had stopped in January and say, yes, but if we throw 10,000 of these things at that problem, we still get a much better result. So, there's a bunch of different engineering and deployment ways that you can get better results and use more compute, even if the underlying scaling doesn't keep carrying on. And there's a bunch of ways in which you can say, well, it looks like in that field, maybe that isn't going to continue. But the underlying issue is that because you don't know how this works at a theoretical level, all of these conversations become hunts for metaphors, which is why the doomer’s start talking about, you know, imagine if there was a meteorite, or imagine if this was a nuclear weapon, because you don't know. And the metaphor I've always kind of liked is that it's sort of like you're building the Apollo program when you don't have a theory of gravity, and you don't actually have a theory of the chemistry of rockets either, like, well, but you made it twice as big and it went three times higher. Okay, so what if we make it twice as big again?
Justin Thomson
One of the great things about T. Rowe Price is we have a genuinely global research platform. So, we're able to draw comparisons between what's going on in China and what's going on in the U.S. I mean, there's an awful lot to talk about in Europe, unfortunately, but I'm interested to know what your interpretation of how this is all going to work. Do you think all these models are going to be fungible, or will the Chinese and the U.S. ecosystem evolve separately?
Benedict Evans
I think everything is still wide open and everything is to play for. You don't want to depend on one company. You don't want to depend on Dario or Sam deciding what you're going to be able to do. So every company I talk to is doing multiple sourcing. I think every product and use-case is making a decision around: do I need a frontier model? And if you are doing a particular point solution for fraud detection inside an ecommerce apparel company, you're going to choose the right model for that, and you're going to look at the cost and the reward. And that might be open, it might be closed, it might be last year's Anthropic model running on a neocloud. It might be a Chinese model. It might be both. I think you have a lot of fragmentation along that price performance curve, and then a conscious decision that we're not going to depend on one.
Second answer is, is a pure geopolitics question, which is on the one hand; America is determined on decoupling. And on the other hand, it looks like China is determined on decoupling. And China doesn't want to have that dependency on American technology either. They don't want to risk being cut off. The lack of access to chips at the same scale that the U.S. labs have, and a much more kind of pragmatic, less winner takes all, less driven to make AGI kind of culture, means that the Chinese labs are not pushing for absolutely the best possible lab result every day. Instead, they're pushing for, you could argue what they're actually optimizing for is let's be a month behind the frontier and a 1/10th of the cost. But clearly we have a kind of a decoupling dynamic there that points towards multiple models, multiple choices, for quite a long time.
Justin Thomson
Okay, I want to move this on to the capital cycle, because I, you know, I think this is in terms of market positioning and asset allocation, this is the topic that we cannot ignore. What fascinates me about this capital cycle is how commonplace trillions has become. Whether it's trillions of capital employed, whether it's pre-IPO valuations, whether it's the number of trillion-dollar market-cap companies we have. I mean, trillions has become common. You've got a very visual metaphor that I really like which you've described the current cycle like a pig in a python, i.e. we are in the process of swallowing this enormous amount of capital, but actually digesting it and deploying it is, is going to be a little bit more difficult. Is it possible to deploy capital at this scale?
Benedict Evans
This quickly? Clearly, it's difficult. The tech industry, I mean, from memory I think the big four platform companies were spending US$100 billion a year on CapEx as we came through the pandemic. This year, their guidance is something over US$700 billion this year, and that probably numbers kind of crept up in the course of the year. And if you add Oracle and Neoclouds and China, you get close to a trillion. And then most people think that the number is going to go up next year. So, you have this enormous surge in the semis industry and a pricing crunch in the semis industry. So, the revenue has gone up a lot more than the volume in semis. The semis industry has always been cyclical, so they were always super nervous about increasing their capacity. And it's really only this year I think that they've really started increasing CapEx to fill this.
And then you have challenges of every bit of the supply chain around data centers, down to like, obscure power electrical equipment that, you know, none of us had ever heard of. And there are all sorts of companies suddenly spiking because they're getting, you know, the business has suddenly doubled to build all of this stuff down to things like gas turbines, where, you know, from memory, the whole industry does like 75 to 100 units a year at this, of these kinds of things, and suddenly they're being asked to double production and they're like, yeah, it doesn't really work like that.
And then, of course, you've got the whole political issue, particularly in the U.S., which some of which, is actually about data centers, some of which I think is not actually about data centers, is about other things. It's broader political issues. So, short answer is, yeah, it's hard to deploy this stuff. And of course, power more than anything else. It's hard to actually get enough power into these things quickly. That gets me to the conversation we're having earlier that like, you know, it's easy to say shortages are followed by gluts. It's important to remember how narrow the adoption is and how much more it could go up quite quickly.
Justin Thomson
To my mind, there are three ways this capital cycle could come to an end. One is Nash equilibrium, the ending of the Nash equilibrium, where everybody to date, their optimal strategy is to invest as fast as they can. And it's in nobody's interest to break that.
Benedict Evans
Prisoners dilemma.
Justin Thomson
Prisoners dilemma. Well, which is all part of game theory. Two, it could be regulation, whether it's on the physical build of data centers, or on the regulation of AI. Or it could be capital markets. Just capital markets go on strike. In investment in markets, we're dealing in probabilities.
Benedict Evans
I would down weight the middle one of those, just given the nature of U.S. politics. And I'm not a politics analyst by any stretch. But it's hard for me to see consensus shifting, like the U.S. political system is, is unlikely to do that quickly. The, so the first is like, does something happen? Let’s phrase this a different way. Does something happen internal to the tech industry that results in the investment slowing down? And secondly, did something happen external to the tech industry? What's happened in the last, certainly this year, arguably the course of last year, is that the capital outgrew the cash flows of the hyperscalers. So, certainly in 2024, this was coming out of cashflow because these were cash generative companies. It's now reached the point that I think Meta and Microsoft, and Alphabet are all at, or above, 50% CapEx to sales this year, and probably higher next year. Amazon is slightly different story because it’s a much lower-margin business. So, they've outgrown it. And so now they are dependent on you. Now they are dependent on the capacity of the cap and willingness of the capital markets to continue providing that in all the ways that that means. And that's debt and private equity, and public equities, and all sorts of other stuff. So, that's one piece, and I'm not going to have an opinion on like what's the capacity of the capital markets to absorb this. That's for other people to talk about.
I think the other side of this is, do we get a paper tomorrow that says, hey, guess what, I get 5x results for a 1/10th of the compute? It seems unlikely, but given we don't have a good theoretical model of how this works it's possible. What's happened? One of the things that's happened this year is the sort of agentic. Is A, agentic, and B, a sort of agentic swarm, if I can make that distinction, which we talked about earlier, in that what's happened with like math’s and what's happened with cyber is you just take 10,000 of these things and throw them at the problem. And so, you have an ability to use way, way, way more compute and get better results. It's kind of back to our scaling point. Maybe the models don't get better, but now you throw 500 models, or 5,000 models, or 50,000 of the same model at that problem, and that gets you better results. So, there's all sorts of questions around this of, like, well, what happens to the demand? And the reason I say this is, it’s perfectly possible that we get to a point, that actually, we can absorb way more demand without needing as much capacity as we thought.
I mean, one of the things we haven't talked about here is that the marginal cost problem shapes consumer adoption. In that, what we're sort of used to from the internet is that you could make it free; go viral, get around, get tens of millions of users, and then work out the revenue because the cost was kind of; could be absorbed within the funding structure of traditional venture capital. That whole playbook of make it free, because marginal cost is so low, and then work out the revenue later doesn't work with AI in the same way.
Justin Thomson
Because marginal costs are very high.
Benedict Evans
Because marginal costs is high. And so, this is what you see at OpenAI is, and this is part of the thing that shapes public perception of this stuff, which is that if you're not paying, you're not seeing today's technology, you're seeing the technology from a while ago because they can't afford to give you unlimited access to today's technology for free. And so, what is the number like? Something like 5% of ChatGPT users are paying. So, most people are using a relatively limited model, not very much. But this is kind of the thing I keep coming back to is; we don't have mass consumer use to drive demand at like really, really drive demand for tokens because it’s almost kind of circular. Like we don't, we couldn't afford, the industry couldn't afford to provide that for free. But whatever the, whatever you want to say about it, clearly right now we don't have something where you can see where hundreds of millions of consumers are using this a lot.
Justin Thomson
Okay. Well, let's in which case, let's move this on from straight economics to, I would like to get a window into Benedict Evans mind as a dreamer. What are you most excited about here: A? B: you know, we focus a lot of attention on the supply side and less on the demand side. And you know, what are the, what are the consumer applications, or the services that you think are going to be the ultimate drivers of demand here?
Benedict Evans
So, and we talked about a little bit about this before, I think maybe sort of two answers to this question. One of them is I was working at a mobile operator in the mid-2000s, and there was kind of a joke that you would go to a conference and people would say, oh, you'll be walking past a Starbucks and your phone will know, and you'll get sent a coupon by Location Services, and you'll get sent a coupon for a free coffee. And this became a joke. And I actually got some research reports from that period that had, like, forecasts of how much money mobile operators would make charging you every time you did a location look up. And meanwhile nobody noticed taxis. And we had everybody; everybody had a phone with a camera. And it didn't really occur to anyone that that was a video camera as well. And it didn't occur to anyone that people would post those pictures publicly because social media kind of wasn't a thing. And so like, you don't know what the use cases are going to be. I mean, this is a kind of tech version of the love of labor fallacy. Like you don't know what the new things will be. Human needs are infinite. So, people will create a whole bunch of new stuff, doing things that you couldn't do before, LLMs, just as we had with mobile, just as we had with the internet and smartphones. That's one answer. Unhelpful answer, but like, it's a deterministic observation. There'll be a whole bunch of new stuff that looks dumb, that we all love, that will be created with this technology.
Second answer is, the things that I'm trying to think about are where does an LLM? What are problems that we can see now that we think LLM can solve for a consumer? And I have a sort of a, like, maybe, four bullet points from firstly like automation of boring stuff, difficult stuff, stuff you can't be bothered with, which is our conversation about bank accounts. Secondly, stuff that is inertia - bank accounts. I'm on the wrong health insurance plan. I'm on the wrong. I should change this. I should change that. But I can't be bothered. Is that done by the LLM agent? Is that done by a dedicated product? Is it somewhere else? How does that work?
Thirdly, like friction, where it's like friction and complexity like get me onto the right credit card. And I think that's kind of different from inertia. I think there's automation and you could argue about this, but there's like, in automation and inertia, and friction purchases. And I suppose what I'm getting at is, like the things where you should do that but don't, and the things where it's not clear what you should do. I think that's a useful distinction. And so maybe everyone; you will be on different credit card if you had an agent that could help you work out the right one to be on.
And then the other extreme is my Instagram coach example. There is so much product. There are so many things you might like; how would you know? And there, we now have systems that might be a much better way of showing you the things that you might like. You know, you didn't know that you would be interested in that book. You didn't know that you would really like that chair, that lamp, that cushion, that coat, that scarf, that pair of shoes. Now, that system will show this to you. And, the conversations it can learn every year, for the last three years, has been, you know: I asked ChatGPT what x, y, z should I buy, what will it tell me? And the guys at Google like, well, sorry, the people at Google put their head in their hands and say it's just SEO (Search Engine Optimization). Same answer. Like what? That's an SEO conversation. Much more interesting to me is the; my previous point is it might suggest different kinds of things, like the shape of the distribution curve. The distribution of work gets bought, might look different, the curve might get steeper, or it might get shallower, might get flatter in different product categories.
And so, just as we had like, the wave of D to C on the internet, we might have like different kinds of things that are now possible to sell, possible to go-to market, possible to get people to buy because agents can walk you through it, or AI can, AI systems can surface those things and suggest those things to you.
Justin Thomson
I think we've got a fantastic window into your imagination of possibilities here, but here's me going to push you up against a wall again. So, you're back. You're back as a partner at a venture capital firm, and I want to know what's, what's going to be in your picnic? Where are you going to lay the bets? Where do you think the value is going to accrue in all this?
Benedict Evans
So, before I go to that, I just, I made a note to make this point, which is used word imagination as conversation with a CEO of a software company on Monday. And he said that he thought there was a shift from information asymmetry to imagination, imagination asymmetry. And what he meant by that was you have to have the imagination to know what to ask. And that's a problem for a model lab, because you're asking the users to have the imagination to think of what to ask. And it's an advantage for an entrepreneur because the entrepreneur is having the imagination to think, oh, this is a thing you could solve with an LLM, and I'm going to build a product around that, and I'm going to show people and I'm going to build the tooling around that. This is the thing that you can do. It's also a, you know, it's a problem for you. Like, okay, the LLM can now analyze all this stuff in a different way. Great. What do I ask for other than like, what's giving me what stocks are going to go up, which seems a little bit too easy.
Justin Thomson
Well, it's interesting because Dan Gardner, who wrote a very popular book called Super Forecasting, the point he made on one of our previous episodes of The Angle, is that in a world of abundant answers, which is the world of AI, having the right questions is going to be key. And I think you've made, just made the same point in another way. But let’s, I want to get back to the point, what's going to be in your VC picnic?
Benedict Evans
So maybe a couple of, of levers here. One of them is, where is AI getting at some fundamental point of leverage in that industry? Is it unlocking something? And you can kind of back test this against the internet, like there were some places where the internet didn't change very much. And if you'd said, you know, we're going to be an internet-enabled law firm, or we're going to be a PC-enabled accounting firm. That wasn't, I mean, that was maybe an opportunity to gain market share. And if you were the first of your peers to deploy spreadsheets, or your execution on that was better than; you could take share. But that didn't fundamentally change the nature of law firms or the nature of accounting firms. Like if you were the first airline to do online booking, you probably gained a bit of share that year. 25 years later, who knows who was the first person to join, to do airline online, airline online flight booking? Who cares?
So, the question is, does the internet get to some fundamental point of leverage? Does AI get to some fundamental point of leverage that changes how you can do this whole thing, and you can pull the whole thing inside out and do it in a completely different way? This is the thing, you know that, and if you go and look at, you know, I mentioned earlier, the typical big company today uses 4 to 500 SaaS apps. And each of those are some entrepreneur realizing that there was this problem inside the compliance department at long-only funds, there is a thing that HR departments at universities do. Somebody has to think of that and work out: this is a problem and this is how we're going to do it, and this is how we're going to solve it, and this is how we're going to get everybody to use it.
And that's 500 SaaS apps inside a big company today. And so, it's one at a time, you know, is that and this is like the kind of the sort of fundamental venture problem which is very different from like being a long-only fund, is it's not what are all the ways that this could go wrong. It's you suspend disbelief and you say, could this work? If it did work, what would that be? Is this a team that can make that work? And every VC now isn't looking at anything that isn't doing AI. But then you have to ask all those questions and that's industry by industry, team by team, product by product. Is this; have they identified some problem that is really big and important? And could it work if they worked out the right approach? Are they going to be able to work out the right approach? Because that's really what you're betting on.
Justin Thomson
This is intended to be an instructional series with some element of practicality. So, we're going to close this, and I would like your view on one skill that investors should learn in the age of AI and one habit they should unlearn?
Benedict Evans
So, there's a, there's a sort of super practical point which is trial the models all the time; throw questions at them. But I think a more useful thing is, is that imagination asymmetry? What are the completely different questions? What happens if you let go? And this is maybe something we should have spent more time on earlier. But like what happens with each wave of technology is that you shift the level of abstraction, and the questions that used to be important stop mattering because the new technology just does those things for you. And instead, there are new questions, new layers of abstraction that become possible that weren't possible before.
And so, you know, imagine you're building and using a CRM and classic CRM. You've got this very complicated data scheme, you've got hundreds of different field types, and you are a great power user when you've constructed this elaborate query that lets you surface all these different things, and now you build an AI-native CRM and you build it as a system of record, and maybe what you do is you just drop every gob of data down on a timeline with a date and a client and no other field type and like client call, app analytics, meeting notes, any piece of data that you have around that client is just dropped onto a timeline with the client name and a date and nothing else. And on one level, this is insane, because now you can't run your 11-field SQL query that says: show me all clients where these kind of salespeople, where senior salesperson spoke to them and they're about to do this, and they have this client value and they have this usage data, and their contract is up in this period. And then that tells me who we need to make sure we call when we sit down in our Monday morning meeting. But you can, but it means you can also say, what are our most important clients who are likely to churn soon?
And that's a real like. It's a hard thing to let go of all the knobs and switches that you kind of can't ask that other kind of question, but now you can ask this new kind of question. And that was implicit in a lot of the stuff I was saying about friction and Instagram and so on. And it's the imagination, an asymmetry of thinking. Wait, I could just ask that question. There's a, there's a concept in military tactics of like mission-based tactics, which is instead of saying to that lieutenant, you need to go to this grid square and you need to march to that bridge and secure that bridge. Instead, you say, okay, the objective of this entire division-wide operation is to achieve this, and you have these resources, and this is to the other people - go do it. And you empower your most junior people to go. And you tell them what the mission is, and it's their job to be empowered to go and do that. And so here the point of my SQL analogy is, is your objective of head of sales to know the right SQL query, or is your objective, okay, which bits of our mission aren't working and which bits are, and how do we achieve that? And I think that's really hard.
Justin Thomson
So, I'm going to, I'm going to read that by saying, you know what you've got to give up is some of the metrics, some of the comfort metrics that you've been used to working with and really figure out what really matters in all this.
Benedict Evans
Yeah. It's, you know, what is the stuff that you do every day and you know, how to do and you know how to turn the handle and you know, the knobs and switches and, you know, some obscure knobs and switches no one else knows around, knows about. And you're comfortable that you've seen every single field and that you know, you know, that you have eyeballed every single meeting that meets the following criteria. And maybe it hasn't occurred to you that, maybe there are other things that are important, that where the answer to your yes/no question is no. So, it's not on the search result, but maybe you should have seen that one too.
Justin Thomson
Okay, I'm going to, I'm going to say this conversation could be infinite. Our time is finite. At which point I'm going to say, Benedict Evans, thank you so much.
Benedict Evans
Thank you.
Justin Thomson
And thank you for listening to The Angle. We look forward to your company on future episodes. You can find more information about this and other topics on our website. Please rate and subscribe wherever you get your podcasts. The Angle. Better questions, better insights. Only from T. Rowe Price.
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Discussions relating to specific securities are for informational and illustrative purposes only, are not recommendations, and the securities may or may not have been held in any T. Rowe Price portfolio. There should be no assumption that the securities were or will be profitable. T. Rowe Price is not affiliated with, or a subsidiary of, any company discussed, however, T. Rowe Price portfolios may be passively invested in the company.
The views contained herein are those of the speakers as of the date of the recording and are subject to change without notice. These views may differ from those of other T. Rowe Price associates and/or affiliates. Information provided by third-party speakers has not been verified by T. Rowe Price. Information is from sources believed to be reliable, but is not guaranteed to be accurate, complete or current.
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Glossary
CRM: Customer Relationship Management
SaaS: Software as a Service
SQL: Structured Query Language
Important Information
Outside of the United States and Australia, this is intended for investment professional use only. Not for further distribution.
This material is being furnished for informational and/or marketing purposes only and does not constitute an offer, recommendation, advice, or solicitation to sell or buy any security.
Prospective investors should seek independent legal, financial and tax advice before making any investment decision.
Past performance is not a guarantee or a reliable indicator of future results. All investments involve risk, including possible loss of principal.
The views contained herein are those of the author(s), are as of October 2026, are subject to change, and may differ from the views of other T. Rowe Price Group companies and/or associates. Under no circumstances should the material, in whole or in part, be copied or redistributed without consent from T. Rowe Price.
The podcast does not give advice or recommendations of any nature; or constitute an offer or solicitation to sell or buy any security in any jurisdiction. Prospective investors should seek independent legal, financial, and tax advice before making any investment decision. Past performance is not a reliable indicator of future performance. All investments are subject to risk, including the possible loss of principal.
Discussions relating to specific securities are for informational and illustrative purposes only, are not recommendations, and the securities may or may not have been held in any T. Rowe Price portfolio. There should be no assumption that the securities were or will be profitable. T. Rowe Price is not affiliated with, or a subsidiary of, any company discussed, however, T. Rowe Price portfolios may be passively invested in the company.
The views contained herein are those of the speakers as of the date of the recording and are subject to change without notice. These views may differ from those of other T. Rowe Price associates and/or affiliates. Information provided by third-party speakers has not been verified by T. Rowe Price. Information is from sources believed to be reliable, but is not guaranteed to be accurate, complete or current.
T. Rowe Price Associates, Inc.'s (TRPA) research platform is global, T. Rowe Price Investment Management, Inc.'s (TRPIM) is not. TRPA and TRPIM are separate investment adviser entities and do not collaborate on research.
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