Proxy Voting Guidelines

This document summarizes the proxy voting guidelines of T. Rowe Price Associates, Inc. (“TRPA”), and certain of its investment advisory affiliates, collectively referred to as “T. Rowe Price”.1

February 2023

RESPONSIBILITY TO VOTE PROXIES

- T. Rowe Price recognizes and adheres to the principle that one of the privileges of owning stock in a company is the right to vote on issues submitted to shareholder vote.

- The registered investment companies which T. Rowe Price sponsors and serves as investment adviser as well as other investment advisory clients have delegated to T. Rowe Price certain proxy voting powers. As an investment adviser, T. Rowe Price has a fiduciary responsibility to such clients when exercising its voting authority with respect to securities held in their portfolios.

T. Rowe Price Regional Voting Guidelines

Following are selected voting issues and the T. Rowe Price proxy voting guidelines for them, broken out by region. Our policies for our Impact and Net Zero portfolios follow the regional sections. These guidelines are reviewed and updated annually.

Key Voting Guidelines: Americas

**Auditor ratification**

Generally FOR approval of auditors. However AGAINST ratification of auditors and/or AGAINST members of the audit committee if:

- An auditor has a financial interest in or association with the company, and is therefore not independent;
- There is reason to believe that the auditor has rendered an opinion that is neither accurate nor indicative of the company’s financial position;
- The auditor has issued an adverse opinion on the company’s most recent financial statements;
- A material weakness under applicable accounting rules rises to a level of serious concern, there are chronic internal control weaknesses, or there is an absence of effective control mechanisms;
- Pervasive evidence indicates that the committee entered into an inappropriate indemnification agreement with its auditor; or
- Non-audit fees are excessive in relation to audit-related fees without adequate explanation.

**Auditor indemnification and limitation of liability**

Generally AGAINST auditor indemnification and limitation of liability that limits shareholders’ ability to pursue legitimate legal recourse against the audit firm.

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1 This document is not applicable to T. Rowe Price Investment Management, Inc. (“TRPIM”). TRPIM votes proxies independently from the other T. Rowe Price-related investment advisers and has adopted its own proxy voting guidelines.
Election of directors

Generally FOR slates with a majority of independent directors.

FOR slates with less than a majority of independent directors if the company has a shareholder (or group of shareholders) who controls the company by means of economic ownership, not supervoting control.

AGAINST individual directors in the following cases:

- Inside directors and affiliated outside directors who serve on the board's Audit, Compensation or Nominating committees;
- Any director who missed more than 25 percent of scheduled board and committee meetings, absent extraordinary circumstances;
- Any director who exhibits such a high number of board commitments overall that it causes concerns about the director’s effectiveness at any one of the companies. A director’s portfolio of private company board seats is a secondary consideration. Specifically, concerns about overboarding arise with:
  - Any director who serves on more than five public company boards; or
  - Any director who is CEO of a publicly traded company and serves on more than one additional public board.
- For U.S.-listed companies that have been independent entities (whether by IPO or spinoff) for more than 10 years yet still maintain classified boards, our guidelines are to oppose the key board members responsible for setting corporate governance standards. After a company has reached a certain level of maturity, our view is it is no longer appropriate to rely on staggered board elections as a defensive mechanism, as these insulate a company’s directors from its shareholders.

AGAINST members of the Nominating and Corporate Governance Committee and the Lead Independent Director (or Independent Chair) in the following case:

- For U.S.-listed companies controlled by means of dual-class stock with superior voting rights, our guidelines are to oppose the key board members responsible for setting corporate governance standards. Over many years of investing in the U.S. equities market, we have reached the conclusion that companies controlled by means of dual-class stock present more disadvantages to long-term investors than any potential advantages unless there is a strong, time-based sunset provision of a reasonable duration. We have become alarmed, in recent years, to see the number of such companies growing due to IPOs. In our view, supporting the re-elections of the Nominating and Governance Committees at such companies sends the message that we are comfortable maintaining their dual-class structures indefinitely. In fact, this is not the case. If we conclude that the positive attributes of the investment, in total, outweigh the risks, we may make the decision to maintain an investment in the company despite the dual-class structure. However, we feel a responsibility to attempt to engage in dialogue with these companies about potential ways they could transition to a one-share, one-vote capital structure over time. Due to the nature of voting at controlled companies, our opposition to board members carries no possibility of changing the outcome. Nevertheless, we believe this voting guideline, accompanied by engagement, is the appropriate way to express our view that control by means of dual-class stock with superior voting rights does not serve the long-term interests of investors.

AGAINST members of the Compensation Committee in the following cases:

- Company re-prices underwater options for stock, cash or other consideration without prior shareholder approval;
- Company has demonstrated poor compensation practices, taking into consideration performance results and other factors; or
- Compensation Committee members approve excessive executive compensation or severance arrangements.

AGAINST the entire board, certain committee members or all directors in the following cases:

- Directors failed to take appropriate action following a proposal that was approved by a majority of shareholders;
- Directors adopted a poison pill without shareholder approval, unless the board has committed to put it to a vote within the next 12 months;
- Directors exhibit persistent failure to represent shareholders’ interests or fail in the oversight of material governance, environmental, or social risks, in the opinion of T. Rowe Price; or
- One or more directors remain on the board after having received less than 50 percent of votes cast in the prior election.
- In cases where T. Rowe Price has voted AGAINST director elections in multiple consecutive years due to one of the concerns listed above, we are likely to escalate the vote to additional directors or to the entire board if the underlying concern remains unaddressed.
Board diversity policy

Board diversity is an important issue for a growing number of investors, including T. Rowe Price. At a high level, the composition of the average company board does not yet reflect the diversity of the stakeholders these companies represent — their employees, customers, suppliers, communities, or investors. Our experience leads us to observe that boards lacking in diversity represent a sub-optimal composition and a potential risk to the company’s competitiveness over time.

We recognize diversity can be defined across a number of dimensions. However, if a board is to be considered meaningfully diverse, in our view some diversity across gender, ethnic, or nationality lines must be present. For companies in the Americas, we generally oppose the re-elections of Governance Committee members if we find no evidence of board diversity.

Climate transparency policy

Our Election of Directors policy includes the possibility that T. Rowe Price may choose to oppose directors for failure in the oversight of material environmental risks. Here we provide additional details on the parameters of this policy.

For companies in the Americas region operating businesses in industries with the highest carbon intensity, our expectation is these companies disclose, at a minimum, their total annual absolute Scope 1 and Scope 2 greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions. Failure by companies in these industries to disclose this data leaves their investors unable to properly analyze their exposure to climate change risk. For this transparency gap, we will generally oppose the re-elections of all non-executive incumbent directors.

To implement this policy, we have identified those companies that are both highly exposed to the impact of climate change and have demonstrated insufficient preparedness for the energy transition. Our screening methodology uses a three-step process:

1) We use the European Union’s Sustainable Finance Disclosure Regulation’s list of high impact climate sectors to define the scope of companies with high exposure.

2) We use our proprietary Responsible Investing Indicator Model (RIIM) to screen within these sectors for companies that may not be adequately managing their climate risks. As a minimum standard, if companies in these sectors are reporting their Scope 1 and 2 greenhouse gas emissions, they are deemed exempted from this policy.

3) Finally, we identify any mitigating or idiosyncratic circumstances that indicate it is not appropriate to apply the policy to a company at this time. For example, exceptions may be made for very small or very newly public companies.

Require independent board chair

CASE-BY-CASE, taking into consideration primarily the views of the portfolio manager as to whether the role of board chair should be a separate position. Secondary considerations include the role of the board’s Lead Independent Director and the board’s overall composition.

Majority voting

Majority voting is a crucial accountability mechanism. We vote FOR proposals asking the board to initiate the process to provide that director nominees be elected by the affirmative majority of votes cast at an annual meeting of shareholders. Resolutions should specify a carve-out for a plurality vote standard when there are more nominees than board seats.

Proxy contests

CASE-BY-CASE, considering the long-term financial performance of the target company relative to its industry, management’s track record, the qualifications of the shareholder’s nominees, and other factors. A detailed statement on this topic is available in our publication T. Rowe Price’s Investment Philosophy on Shareholder Activism. For a copy of this publication, visit www.troweprice.com/esg

Proxy access

T. Rowe Price believes significant, long-term investors should be able to nominate director candidates using the company’s proxy, subject to reasonable limitations. Generally, FOR shareholder proposals offering a balanced set of limitations and requirements for proxy access. We support proposals suggesting ownership of three percent of shares outstanding with a three-year holding period as the standard for access to the proxy. We do not believe there should be undue impediments to a proponent’s ability to aggregate holdings with other shareholders in order to qualify for access to the proxy. Generally, we will vote AGAINST proposals (whether sponsored by shareholders or by management) putting forth requirements materially different from these thresholds. We will also vote AGAINST shareholders proposals to amend existing proxy access bylaws if the company has already adopted a bylaw that meets the general parameters described above.

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2 Scope 1 (direct emissions from owned or controlled sources), Scope 2 (indirect emissions from the generation of purchased electricity, steam, or cooling) and Scope 3 (all other indirect emissions).
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<td><strong>Annual vs. staggered board elections</strong></td>
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<td><strong>Simple majority vs. supermajority provisions</strong></td>
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### Key Voting Guidelines: Americas continued

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<tr>
<th><strong>Adjourn meeting or other business</strong></th>
<th>AGAINST, as the company should abide by the vote results as of the date of the meeting.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Shareholder proposals related to political spending and lobbying</strong></td>
<td>CASE-BY-CASE, if we believe the decision to engage in political or lobbying activities poses a unique risk for a particular company and it is unclear whether the board oversees and monitors such risk adequately, T. Rowe Price will generally support shareholder resolutions seeking additional disclosure. A company’s level of disclosure on this issue relative to its peers is a consideration, as is the level of consistency between a company’s public statements on ESG issues and the nature of its lobbying activity.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Shareholder proposals of a social or environmental nature</strong></td>
<td>Shareholder proposals of a social or environmental nature – It is T. Rowe Price policy to analyze every shareholder proposal of a social or environmental nature on a CASE-BY-CASE basis. See the section labeled Guidelines for Shareholder Proposals of an Environmental, Social or Political Nature.</td>
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**Key Voting Guidelines: EMEA**

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<th>Category</th>
<th>Guidelines</th>
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<td><strong>Approve financial results, director reports</strong></td>
<td>FOR, unless there are concerns about the accounts presented or the audit procedures used, or if the company does not provide adequate information to make a decision.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Appointment of auditors and auditor fees</strong></td>
<td>FOR the reelection of auditors and proposals authorizing the board to fix auditor fees. AGAInst if there are serious concerns about the accounts presented or the audit procedures used; the auditors are being changed without explanation; or non audit-related fees are substantial or are routinely in excess of standard annual audit-related fees. AGAInst the appointment of external auditors if they have previously served the company in an executive capacity or can otherwise be considered affiliated with the company. A “cooling off” exception will be considered after three years for retired partners of a company's auditor. AGAInst, if the company has not disclosed the auditor’s fees.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Approve allocation of income</strong></td>
<td>Generally FOR. In cases of payout ratios on either end of the extreme (less than 30% or greater than 100%), CASE-BY-CASE.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Board diversity policy</strong></td>
<td>Board diversity is an important issue for a growing number of investors, including T. Rowe Price. At a high level, the composition of the average company board does not yet reflect the diversity of the stakeholders these companies represent — their employees, customers, suppliers, communities, or investors. Our experience leads us to observe that boards lacking in diversity represent a sub-optimal composition and a potential risk to the company’s competitiveness over time. We recognize diversity can be defined across a number of dimensions. However, if a board is to be considered meaningfully diverse, in our view some diversity across gender, ethnic, or nationality lines must be present. For companies in EMEA we generally oppose the re-elections of Governance Committee members if we find no evidence of board diversity. In markets where there is a well-established expectation for board diversity (regulatory, quasi-regulatory or listing standards), T. Rowe Price will generally apply the same expectation. (U.K., Ireland) Over the course of 2023 and 2024, our voting in these markets will reflect rising expectations for board diversity (both by gender and by ethnicity) as well as diverse representation on the executive committee level. For smaller companies in these markets, our diversity policy is applied to single-gender boards. (Europe) In the Continental European markets our minimum expectation for board diversity of companies on the main listing is they should be at least 30% diverse by gender. For smaller companies in these markets, our diversity policy is applied to single-gender boards. (EMEA) Elsewhere in EMEA our diversity policy is applied to single-gender boards.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Climate transparency policy</strong></td>
<td>Our Election of Directors policy includes the possibility that T. Rowe Price may choose to oppose directors for failure in the oversight of material environmental risks. Here we provide additional details on the parameters of this policy. For companies in the EMEA region operating businesses in industries with the highest carbon intensity, our expectation is these companies disclose, at a minimum, their total annual absolute Scope 1 and Scope 2 greenhouse gas emissions. Failure by companies in these industries to disclose this data leaves their investors unable to properly analyze their exposure to climate change risk. For this transparency gap, we will generally oppose the re-elections of all non-executive incumbent directors. To implement this policy, we have identified those companies that are both highly exposed to the impact of climate change and have demonstrated insufficient preparedness for the energy transition. Our screening methodology uses a three-step process: 1) We use the European Union’s Sustainable Finance Disclosure Regulation’s list of high impact climate sectors to define the scope of companies with high exposure. 2) We use our proprietary Responsible Investing Indicator Model (RIIM) to screen within these sectors for companies that may not be adequately managing their climate risks. As a minimum standard, if companies in these sectors are reporting their Scope 1 and 2 greenhouse gas emissions, they are deemed exempted from this policy. 3) Finally we identify any mitigating or idiosyncratic circumstances that indicate it is not appropriate to apply the policy to a company at this time. For example, exceptions may be made for very small or very newly public companies.</td>
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</tbody>
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3 Scope 1 (direct emissions from owned or controlled sources), Scope 2 (indirect emissions from the generation of purchased electricity, steam, or cooling) and Scope 3 (all other indirect emissions).
### Key Voting Guidelines: EMEA continued

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Category</th>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Discharge of board and management</strong></td>
<td>Generally, <strong>FOR</strong>. AGAINST if significant and compelling controversy exists surrounding the board's execution of its duties, or if legal action is being taken against company directors.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Related party transactions</strong></td>
<td><strong>CASE-BY-CASE</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| **Election of directors**                     | Generally, **FOR**. AGAINST if:  
  - Adequate disclosure has not been provided in a timely manner;  
  - There are clear concerns over questionable finances or restatements;  
  - There have been questionable transactions with conflicts of interest;  
  - There are any records of abuses against minority shareholder interests; or  
  - The board fails to meet minimum corporate governance standards  
  Vote **FOR** individual nominees unless there are specific concerns about the individual, such as criminal wrongdoing, breach of fiduciary responsibilities or egregious failure to oversee material governance, environmental, or social incidents.  
  Vote **AGAINST** individual directors if absences (>25%) at board meetings have not been explained (in countries where this information is disclosed).  
  Vote **AGAINST** shareholder nominees unless they demonstrate a clear ability to contribute positively to board deliberations.  
  Vote **AGAINST** labor representatives if they sit on either the audit or compensation committee, as they are not required to be on those committees.  
  Vote **AGAINST** insiders and affiliated directors if the board does not meet local best-practice standards for overall independence.  
  (UK only) Vote **AGAINST** executives holding a combined CEO and Chair role, absent a compelling explanation for why this non-standard structure is appropriate.  
  In cases where a negative vote is warranted for the Chair of any company, T. Rowe Price may enter an **ABSTAIN** to keep our response proportionate to the issue. |
| **Renew partial takeover provision**           | **FOR** |
| **Lower disclosure threshold for stock ownership** | **AGAINST** |
| **Issue shares (with or without preemptive rights)** | General Issuances:  
  - Generally, **FOR** issuance requests with preemptive rights to a maximum of 50% over currently issued capital.  
  - Vote **FOR** issuance requests without preemptive rights to a maximum of 10% of currently issued capital, in most markets.  
  - Exceptions are made for smaller cap European companies, for which we would generally approve requests up to 100% with pre-emptive rights and 20% without rights.  
  Specific Issuances:  
  - Vote **CASE-BY-CASE** on all requests, with or without preemptive rights.  
  - In the U.K. market we generally support resolutions in line with the Pre-Emption Group Principles. |
| **Share repurchase plans**                    | **CASE-BY-CASE**. Generally **FOR** repurchase authorities up to 10% of issued share capital, unless there is clear evidence of past abuse of the authority, or the plan contains no safeguards against selective buybacks. |
| **Increase authorized capital**               | Vote **AGAINST** proposals to adopt unlimited capital authorizations.  
  Vote **FOR** non-specific proposals to increase authorized capital up to 100% over the current authorization unless the increase would leave the company with less than 30% of its new authorization outstanding.  
  Vote **FOR** specific proposals to increase authorized capital to any amount, unless:  
  - The specific purpose of the increase (such as a share-based acquisition or merger) does not meet TRP guidelines for the purpose being proposed.  
  - The increase would leave the company with less than 30% of its new authorization outstanding after adjusting for all proposed issuances. |

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<table>
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<tr>
<th>Topic</th>
<th>Guidelines</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Equity plans</strong></td>
<td>CASE-BY-CASE, taking into account plan features such as the number of shares reserved for issuance, the growth characteristics of the company, any discounts applied to the exercise price, the plan’s administration, performance and vesting criteria, the repricing policy, the breadth of distribution of options within the company, and other features. CASE-BY-CASE consideration of stock grants outside of established plans, taking into account the total potential dilution of the grant when combined with existing plans.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Incentive plans</strong> (ESPPs and share option schemes)</td>
<td>CASE-BY-CASE, taking into account employee eligibility, dilution, offering period and offering price, discounts, participation limits and loan terms.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Approve remuneration policy/Approve remuneration report</strong></td>
<td>Assess each company’s compensation practices on a CASE-BY-CASE basis, taking into account how performance conditions for all elements of variable pay are clearly aligned with the company’s strategic objectives, with vesting and holding periods that are in line with local good practice. Companies electing to include ESG metrics in their remuneration plans should demonstrate that such metrics are both material to the company’s results and quantifiable. A comprehensive discussion of our global compensation principles is on page 12.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Mergers and acquisitions</strong></td>
<td>CASE-BY-CASE. Vote AGAINST if the companies do not provide sufficient information to make an informed voting decision.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Mandatory take-over bid waivers</strong></td>
<td>CASE-BY-CASE.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Expansion of business activities</strong></td>
<td>Generally, FOR.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Shareholder proposals of a social or environmental nature</strong></td>
<td>Shareholder proposals of a social or environmental nature – It is T. Rowe Price policy to analyze every shareholder proposal of a social or environmental nature on a CASE-BY-CASE basis. See the section labeled Guidelines for Shareholder Proposals of an Environmental, Social or Political Nature.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Management proposal to approve climate plan (“Say on Climate”)</strong></td>
<td>Vote CASE-BY-CASE on management proposals requesting shareholders approve the company’s climate transition action plan, taking into account the completeness and rigor of the plan. A detailed discussion of our framework for assessing Say on Climate votes is found in our Net Zero Voting Policy section later in this document.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Virtual Shareholder Meetings</strong></td>
<td>In general, T. Rowe Price supports management discretion to host its annual or special meetings in a virtual format, assuming appropriate mechanisms are in place to enable shareholder participation. For companies that select practices outside of established regional norms, we may oppose the resolutions enabling the virtual shareholder meeting format.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Key Voting Guidelines: Asia-Pacific

Approve financial results, director reports, auditor reports

FOR, unless there are concerns about the accounts presented or the audit procedures used, or if the company does not provide adequate information to make a decision.

Appointment of auditors and auditor fees

FOR the reelection of auditors and proposals authorizing the board to fix auditor fees.
AGAINST if there are serious concerns about the accounts presented or the audit procedures used; the auditors are being changed without explanation; or non audit-related fees are substantial or are routinely in excess of standard annual audit-related fees.
AGAINST the appointment of external auditors if they have previously served the company in an executive capacity or can otherwise be considered affiliated with the company. A “cooling off” exception will be considered after three years for retired partners of a company’s auditor.
AGAINST, if the company has not disclosed the auditor’s fees.

Approve allocation of income

Generally FOR. In cases of payout ratios on either end of the extreme (less than 30% or greater than 100%), CASE-BY-CASE.

Appointment of internal statutory auditors

FOR, unless:
■ There are serious concerns about the statutory reports presented or the audit procedures;
■ Questions exist concerning any of the statutory auditors being appointed; or
■ The auditors have previously served the company in an executive capacity or can otherwise be considered affiliated with the company.

Related party transactions

CASE-BY-CASE

Election of directors

Generally, FOR.
Vote AGAINST if:
■ Adequate disclosure has not been provided in a timely manner;
■ There are clear concerns over questionable finances or restatements;
■ There have been questionable transactions with conflicts of interest;
■ There are any records of abuses against minority shareholder interests; or
■ The board fails to meet minimum corporate governance standards
Vote FOR individual nominees unless there are specific concerns about the individual, such as criminal wrongdoing, breach of fiduciary responsibilities or egregious failure to oversee material governance, environmental, or social incidents.
Vote AGAINST individual directors if absences (>25%) at board meetings have not been explained (in countries where this information is disclosed).
Vote AGAINST shareholder nominees unless they demonstrate a clear ability to contribute positively to board deliberations.
Vote AGAINST insiders and affiliated directors if the board does not meet local best-practice standards for overall independence.
Vote AGAINST the entire board if, at a minimum, the names of the director nominees are not disclosed in advance of the meeting.
(Japan only) If cross-shareholdings are in place, directors of each company will not be considered independent under T. Rowe Price policy.
In cases where a negative vote is warranted for the Chair of any company, T. Rowe Price may enter an ABSTAIN to keep our response proportionate to the issue.
(Japan) If cross-shareholdings are in place, directors of each company will not be considered independent under T. Rowe Policy.
(Japan) Vote against the top executive(s) if a company allocates a significant portion of its net assets to cross-shareholdings.
(Japan) Vote against the top executive(s) if at least one-third of the board members are not outside directors.
### Board diversity policy

Board diversity policy is an important issue for a growing number of investors, including T. Rowe Price. At a high level, the composition of the average company board does not yet reflect the diversity of the stakeholders these companies represent — their employees, customers, suppliers, communities, or investors. Our experience leads us to observe that boards lacking in diversity represent a sub-optimal composition and a potential risk to the company’s competitiveness over time.

We recognize diversity can be defined across a number of dimensions. However, if a board is to be considered meaningfully diverse, in our view some diversity across gender, ethnic, or nationality lines must be present. For companies in the Asia-Pacific region, we generally oppose the re-elections of Governance Committee members and/or senior executives, as appropriate, if we find no evidence of board diversity.

In markets where there is a well-established expectation for board diversity (regulatory, quasi-regulatory or listing standards), T. Rowe Price will generally apply the same expectation.

(Australia) Starting in 2023, our expectations of Australian issuers in the ASX 300 is to have at least 30% diversity by gender.

### Climate transparency policy

Our Election of Directors policy includes the possibility that T. Rowe Price may choose to oppose directors for failure in the oversight of material environmental risks. Here we provide additional details on the parameters of this policy.

For companies in the Asia-Pacific region operating businesses in industries with the highest carbon intensity, our expectation is these companies disclose, at a minimum, their total annual absolute Scope 1 and Scope 2 greenhouse gas emissions. Failure by companies in these industries to disclose this data leaves their investors unable to properly analyze their exposure to climate change risk. For this transparency gap, we will generally oppose the re-elections of all non-executive incumbent directors.

To implement this policy, we have identified those companies that are both highly exposed to the impact of climate change and have demonstrated insufficient preparedness for the energy transition. Our screening methodology uses a three-step process:

1. We use the European Union’s Sustainable Finance Disclosure Regulation’s list of high impact climate sectors to define the scope of companies with high exposure.
2. We use our proprietary Responsible Investing Indicator Model (RIIM) to screen within these sectors for companies that may not be adequately managing their climate risks. As a minimum standard, if companies in these sectors are reporting their Scope 1 and 2 greenhouse gas emissions, they are deemed exempted from this policy.
3. Finally we identify any mitigating or idiosyncratic circumstances that indicate it is not appropriate to apply the policy to a company at this time. For example, exceptions may be made for very small or very newly public companies.

### Renew partial takeover provision

**FOR**

### Lower disclosure threshold for stock ownership

**AGAINST**

### Issue shares (with or without preemptive rights)

- General Issuances:
  - Generally, FOR issuance requests with preemptive rights to a maximum of 50% over currently issued capital.
  - Vote FOR issuance requests without preemptive rights to a maximum of 10% of currently issued capital, in most markets.

- Specific Issuances:
  - Vote CASE-BY-CASE on all requests, with or without preemptive rights.

### Share repurchase plans

**CASE-BY-CASE.** Generally FOR repurchase authorities up to 10% of issued share capital, unless there is clear evidence of past abuse of the authority, or the plan contains no safeguards against selective buybacks.

### Incentive plans (ESPPs and share option schemes)

**CASE-BY-CASE,** taking into account employee eligibility, dilution, offering period and offering price, discounts, participation limits and loan terms.

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4 Scope 1 (direct emissions from owned or controlled sources), Scope 2 (indirect emissions from the generation of purchased electricity, steam, or cooling) and Scope 3 (all other indirect emissions).
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<tr>
<th><strong>Key Voting Guidelines: Asia-Pacific continued</strong></th>
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| **Increase authorized capital** | Vote **AGAINST** proposals to adopt unlimited capital authorizations.  
Vote **FOR** non-specific proposals to increase authorized capital up to 100% over the current authorization unless the increase would leave the company with less than 30% of its new authorization outstanding.  
Vote **FOR** specific proposals to increase authorized capital to any amount, unless:  
  - The specific purpose of the increase (such as a share-based acquisition or merger) does not meet TRP guidelines for the purpose being proposed.  
  - The increase would leave the company with less than 30% of its new authorization outstanding after adjusting for all proposed issuances. |
| **Equity plans** | CASE-BY-CASE, taking into account plan features such as the number of shares reserved for issuance, the growth characteristics of the company, any discounts applied to the exercise price, the plan's administration, performance and vesting criteria, the repricing policy, the breadth of distribution of options within the company, and other features.  
CASE-BY-CASE consideration of stock grants outside of established plans, taking into account the total potential dilution of the grant when combined with existing plans. |
| **Ratify remuneration report (“Say on Pay”)** | Assess each company's compensation practices on a CASE-BY-CASE basis, taking into account company performance, terms of executive contracts, level of compensation, mix of compensation types, the quality of disclosure on compensation practices, and the company's overall governance profile. A comprehensive discussion of our global compensation principles is on page 12. |
| **Mergers and acquisitions** | CASE-BY-CASE  
Vote **AGAINST** if the companies do not provide sufficient information to make an informed voting decision. |
| **Poison pills** | Generally, **AGAINST**. |
| **Expansion of business activities** | Generally, **FOR**. |
| **Debt issuance requests** | **FOR** proposals to issue convertible debt instruments unless they create excessive dilution under TRP’s equity issuance guidelines.  
**FOR** proposals to restructure debt, unless the terms of the restructuring would adversely affect shareholder rights.  
Vote non-convertible debt issuance requests on a CASE-BY-CASE basis, with or without preemptive rights. |
| **Pledging of assets for debt** | CASE-BY-CASE |
| **Share reissuance plans** | Generally FOR unless there is evidence of past abuse of this authority. |
| **Increase borrowing power** | CASE-BY-CASE |
| **Shareholder proposals** | CASE-BY-CASE |
| **Shareholder proposals of a social or environmental nature** | Shareholder proposals of a social or environmental nature – It is T. Rowe Price policy to analyze every shareholder proposal of a social or environmental nature on a CASE-BY-CASE basis. See the section labeled Guidelines for Shareholder Proposals of an Environmental, Social or Political Nature. |
| **Management proposal to approve climate plan (“Say on Climate”)** | Vote CASE-BY-CASE on management proposals requesting shareholders approve the company’s climate transition action plan, taking into account the completeness and rigor of the plan. A detailed discussion of our framework for assessing Say on Climate votes is found in our Net Zero Voting Policy section later in this document. |
| **Virtual Shareholder Meetings** | In general, T. Rowe Price supports management discretion to host its annual or special meetings in a virtual format, assuming appropriate mechanisms are in place to enable shareholder participation. For companies that select practices outside of established regional norms, we may oppose the resolutions enabling the virtual shareholder meeting format. |
**Impact Voting Policy**

A separate set of proxy voting guidelines is administered for the T. Rowe Price Impact strategies. These portfolios require a separate voting policy because they have two express mandates: competitive financial returns as well as positive social and environmental impact. In order to meet these objectives, the Impact portfolios may vote differently from other T. Rowe Price Funds, particularly on director elections and shareholder resolutions. The focus on social equity may be reflected in certain remuneration votes.

For the T. Rowe Price Impact strategies, our proxy voting program serves as one element of our overall relationship with corporate issuers. We use our voting power in a way that complements the other aspects of our relationship with these companies, including engagement, investment diligence, and investment decision-making. A customized set of proxy voting guidelines helps us establish governance norms and follow a differentiated stewardship approach.

### Key guidelines include:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Election of directors</th>
<th>AGAINST the Board Chair or certain committee members in the following cases:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>■ if ESG disclosure expectations are not met within a reasonable time period. We encourage companies to disclose in line with the Sustainability Accounting Standards Board (SASB) and the Task Force on Climate-Related Financial Disclosures (TCFD) disclosure frameworks and will take this into account when making the voting decision.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>■ for inadequate oversight of ESG controversies, including insufficient preparedness for the low-carbon transition.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shareholder resolutions</td>
<td>CASE-BY-CASE, expects to support shareholder resolutions which request improved ESG disclosures and practices.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Company-specific issues</td>
<td>The portfolio manager may make other voting decisions, aligned with the investment objective of the Fund.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alignment</td>
<td>These Impact equity-specific guidelines are in addition to the appropriate regional voting guidelines as set out in the T. Rowe Price Proxy Voting Guidelines. The portfolio manager may make other voting decisions, aligned with the investment objective of the Fund.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Net Zero Policy

A separate set of proxy voting guidelines is administered for T. Rowe Price strategies subject to an explicit Net Zero investment framework. These portfolios require a separate voting policy because they have two explicit mandates: competitive financial returns as well as alignment with Net Zero goals. In order to meet these objectives, portfolios under Net Zero mandates may vote differently from other T. Rowe Price Funds, particularly on director elections, Say on Climate resolutions, and shareholder proposals.

Key guidelines include:

**Election of directors**

AGAINST the Board Chair or certain committee members in the following cases:
- if climate-related disclosure expectations are not met within a reasonable time period. We encourage companies to disclose in line with the Task Force on Climate-Related Financial Disclosures (TCFD) framework and will take this into account when making the voting decision.
- for inadequate oversight of climate-related controversies, including insufficient preparedness for the low-carbon transition.

**Shareholder resolutions**

CASE-BY-CASE. Net Zero mandates are likely to support shareholder resolutions which request accelerated climate-related disclosures and practices.

**Company-specific issues**

The portfolio manager may make other voting decisions to override our standard voting guidelines, if aligned with the investment objective of the Fund.

**Say on Climate**

Our approach to assessing the adequacy of a company’s climate transition plan is a CASE-BY-CASE analysis. We will pay particular attention to the level of disclosure including whether it is in line with TCFD recommendations, the current greenhouse gas emission reduction targets and the credibility of the company’s decarbonization strategy. Our analysis may vary to some extent based on region and industry; similarly, the focus on scope 1-2 versus scope 3 emissions will vary by sector. We will also consider the company’s governance arrangements and willingness to engage on the topic of climate.

We view best practice as adopting a science-based net zero aligned to a 1.5°C pathway that covers scope 1-2 and the most relevant scope 3 emissions, ideally with targets validated by the Science Based Targets initiative (SBTi). For the majority of companies, we believe this is an appropriate expectation; however, we recognize that not all companies or sectors start in the same position when considering decarbonization targets. Additionally, not all companies will feel comfortable setting a net zero target if the technology to reach net zero is not yet available or economically viable. Similarly, some companies will see the establishment of a net zero target as a way to build the motivation to reach this ambition. As such, our net zero analysis does not solely focus on whether a company has a net zero target in place; it also includes a company’s short- and medium-term GHG reduction targets and credibility of its emissions trajectory. It is underpinned by the principles established by the Paris Aligned Investment Initiative Net Zero Framework and includes the following areas of focus:
- Net zero target by 2050 or earlier
- Medium-term GHG reduction targets
- Short-term GHG reduction targets
- Assessment of the credibility of the pathway to achieve targets
- Science Based Targets initiative (SBTi) validation
- Recent emissions trajectory

When analyzing the net zero or other GHG reduction targets set by our investee companies, it is our expectation that companies will try to align with a 1.5°C pathway.

Our view is a nuanced, company-specific analysis is required for each resolution in this category. To do this analysis, we utilize research reports from our external proxy advisor, company filings and sustainability reports, and research from other investors and non-governmental organizations. The perspective of our internal Responsible Investment team and our internal industry research analysts is a primary consideration.

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5 Scope 1 (direct emissions from owned or controlled sources), Scope 2 (indirect emissions from the generation of purchased electricity, steam, or cooling) and Scope 3 (all other indirect emissions).
Executive Compensation Guidelines

Votes on compensation matters take a number of different forms in markets around the world, including:

- votes to approve new equity plans;
- votes to approve adding new shares to an existing equity plan;
- votes to approve specific grants of shares to executives;
- advisory votes on executives’ compensation ("Say on Pay");
- binding votes on executives’ compensation or pay plans; and
- shareholder resolutions addressing certain aspects of executive compensation.

Generally, our approach to all of these categories is to assess how reasonable the resolution is in light of the company’s strategy, relative performance, absolute performance, industry, size, and location. Our objective is to identify and support compensation resolutions that are both aligned with the long-term interests of shareholders and thoroughly explained in the company’s public disclosures.

Following are more detailed explanations of our voting guidelines in the three main areas of executive compensation: Equity Plans, Say on Pay and Shareholder Proposals.

Executive Compensation Issues—Equity Plans

We believe long-term equity plans, used appropriately, provide strong alignment of interests between executives and investors. These plans can be effective in linking executives’ pay to the company’s performance as well as attracting and retaining management talent. We evaluate requests to approve or renew equity plans on a case-by-case basis, taking into account the overall cost of the plan (absolute and relative to peers); the company’s past performance; the company’s size, industry and growth rate; vesting provisions; and the key qualitative features of the plan. We oppose plans that are excessively costly, as well as those with problematic features such as evergreen or repricing provisions. We may also oppose equity plans at any company where we deem the overall compensation practices to be problematic.

We generally oppose efforts to reprice options in the event of a decline in value of the underlying stock unless such requests appropriately balance shareholder and employee interests and are subject to shareholder approval.

Say on Pay

Shareholder votes to approve executive compensation — generally votes of an advisory nature — have become common in markets around the world. It is challenging to apply a rules-based framework to compensation votes because every pay program is a unique reflection of the company’s performance, industry, size, geographic mix, and competitive landscape. Additionally, factors such as executives’ individual performance, achievement of goals, experience, tenure, skills, and leadership should be taken into account in evaluating the overall compensation context. For these reasons, T. Rowe Price takes a case-by-case approach to “Say on Pay” votes.

Outside the U.S., we generally assess a company’s disclosure about its executive compensation program in relation to contemporary standards in its home market. Further analysis is focused on the degree of alignment between the company’s long-term performance and the payouts generated under its compensation program. We use research reports from our outside proxy-services specialist, ISS, as an important input into our analysis.

Within the U.S., T. Rowe Price votes more “Say on Pay” resolutions than in any other market due to the frequency of these votes and our number of holdings. Therefore, we have adopted a screening approach to identify companies with persistent gaps in their pay/performance alignment and companies using compensation practices or structures that may be problematic. The screen looks at compensation through four different perspectives:

a) Pay/Performance Alignment

We look at correlation between executive pay and company performance over periods of three, four, and five years. Performance is defined in terms of total shareholder return and financial measures appropriate for the company’s primary industry.

b) Pay Practices

We consider the presence of compensation practices that may be outdated or may, in our experience, impede the alignment of executives’ and shareholders’ interests. Examples of such practices include supplemental executive retirement plans, excessive golden parachutes, unreasonable perquisites, tax gross-up provisions, large gaps in internal pay equity, single triggers in the change-of-control plan, automatic benchmarking in the top half of the company’s peer group, and the use of special, one-time equity grants for retention or similar purposes.
c) External Perspectives

The recommendations of our outside proxy advisor, ISS, and the results from the prior year’s advisory compensation vote (if any) form the third lens through which we assess pay programs. These external data points are indicators of the overall market’s assessment of the company’s approach to compensation.

d) Absolute Level of Pay

The fourth element of our screen is a look at the absolute level of reported executive pay. We assess this figure relative to other companies whose stocks are held in our clients’ portfolios, companies we would deem loosely similar in size, industry, and growth profile. The purpose of this analysis is to identify outliers, which we define as companies paying their executives in the top quartile of their respective sectors. In our view, it may be appropriate for the board’s Compensation Committee to decide to pay at the top end of the peer set if the company also delivers persistently strong relative performance. Additionally, there may be unique, one-off circumstances causing a company to appear at the top end of the peer group in a single year, such as when there has been a succession in the executive suite. However, when we find companies consistently delivering industry-leading compensation without also delivering consistent industry-leading results, our screen triggers further analysis.

The screen is just the first stage of the process. If a company’s compensation profile registers high negative scores in one or more of the four areas described above, it leads to a qualitative review. In this review, we assess the circumstances that led to the high score, review the company’s proxy filing for the rationale behind the compensation decisions in that period, and consult the T. Rowe Price equity analyst who follows the company. Often, we engage with the company to request additional context and perspective. After this second-stage review, we put forth a recommendation to the portfolio managers who own shares of the company in their clients’ portfolios: either to support or oppose the resolution.

With regard to the question of how frequently U.S. companies should offer shareholders a “Say on Pay” vote, we generally prefer an annual cycle.

Shareholder Proposals

Shareholder resolutions on compensation matters are relatively uncommon. The T. Rowe Price voting guidelines generally oppose shareholder resolutions of a prescriptive nature, which aim to change a particular element of a company’s compensation program. Examples of such resolutions include proposals asking that executives be subject to mandatory holding periods on their equity awards and proposals asking for specific financial metrics or sustainability goals to be added to the pay program. Generally, we believe such questions are highly dependent on the company’s specific circumstances and therefore should be left to the discretion of the board’s Compensation Committee.

Some resolutions are aimed at compensation practices that we have found to be persistently problematic across a range of companies, so we are more likely to support resolutions of this nature. One example is a proposal to update certain provisions of a company’s golden parachute plan. Since we frequently find outdated provisions in such plans, and we believe they can reduce the alignment of interests between executives and shareholders, we often find these types of resolutions constructive.

Fairness in pay decisions

For our pay-related proxy voting decisions, alongside our traditional assessment of pay-for-performance alignment, pay practices and absolute level of pay, we also assess pay outcomes through the lens of fairness. In general, pay decisions where none of the key groups (executives, employees and other stakeholders including shareholders) disproportionately benefit compared to others can expect our support. Companies that have not taken a sufficiently long-term and balanced perspective risk damaging their relationships with key stakeholders, which ultimately may impact the sustainability of their business models.

Conclusion

Well structured incentive programs can be key contributors to executive management decisions that serve to enhance value creation over time. The corollary is also true: incentive programs with inappropriate performance objectives or other design weaknesses tend to impede the alignment of management’s incentives with investors’ interests. In our view, it is our responsibility as engaged investors to understand the compensation programs of the companies we’ve invested in and to provide feedback to those companies — through our proxy votes and through direct engagement — where we find cause for concern.
Guidelines for Shareholder Proposals of an Environmental, Social or Political Nature

It is T. Rowe Price policy to analyze every shareholder proposal of a social or environmental nature on a CASE-BY-CASE basis. The quality and relevance of shareholder resolutions varies widely across markets, as does each company’s disclosure around environmental and social risks and its preparedness on these issues. Our view is a nuanced, company-specific analysis is required for each shareholder resolution in this category.

To do this analysis, we utilize research reports from our external proxy advisor, company filings and sustainability reports, and research from other investors and non-governmental organizations. The perspective of our internal Responsible Investment team and our internal industry research analysts is a primary consideration.

Generally speaking, we support well targeted proposals addressing concerns that are particularly relevant for a company’s business but have not yet been adequately addressed by management.

To the extent we conclude that a company’s existing disclosure on an environmental or social topic is adequate for our needs as investors, we may conclude it is not prudent to ask the company to spend additional resources on incremental improvements to such disclosure.

Our general approach to resolutions in each category is:

**Political spending & lobbying**
We believe corporate participation in the political process, where allowed by law, is appropriate. However, recently, we have observed a widening disconnect between what companies publicly disclose about their approach to environmental and governance matters and what their trade organizations advocate on their behalf. To the extent that we find mismatches of this nature, or generally poor disclosure regarding the board’s oversight of political activity, we have supported an increasing number of shareholder resolutions asking for more transparency around political activity.

**Environmental issues**
As part of our normal ESG engagement program, we encourage companies to improve their environmental disclosures. The current lack of standardization in environmental reporting makes it more difficult for us to analyze companies’ environmental exposure. This is why we recommend using two specific reporting frameworks: the Sustainable Accounting Standards Board (SASB) and the Taskforce on Climate-Related Disclosures (TFCD).

While we support the aim of many environmental proposals to improve disclosure, we find that a significant number of them ask for nonstandardized or ancillary disclosures. In these cases, we often find it difficult to support the shareholder proposal but will use the opportunity to engage with the company on improving its environmental disclosure using the SASB and TFCD frameworks. In our case-by-case analysis of environmental proposals, the current level of disclosure is our most important consideration. We also take into account the materiality of the issue for the company; the disclosure framework being requested; our prior engagement with the company on environmental matters; the views of our Responsible Investment team; the identity of the proponents, if available, and their stated intentions; and the degree to which the proposal is prescriptive.

**Social Issues**
Our approach to socially oriented resolutions is similar to the environmental category. We assess them on a case-by-case basis, taking into account the materiality of the issue being raised, the company’s existing level of disclosure, the degree to which the resolution is prescriptive, the views of our Responsible Investment team, the stated intentions of the proponents, and our engagement history with the company.

After our case-by-case analysis of social and environmental proposals, our voting decisions generally fall into these categories:

- We agree with the proponent and vote FOR.
- We find the company already provides sufficient disclosure on the topic in question, so we vote AGAINST a proposal requesting additional disclosure.
- We disagree with the objectives of the proponent on principle, so we vote AGAINST the proposal.
- The company has already disclosed its intentions to provide the disclosure requested by the proponent. In these cases, we may conclude there is no need to support the resolution.
- We may agree with certain elements of the proposal, but find the framing too prescriptive, or in some other way unreasonable or unrealistic. An example would be if the proponent was requiring additional reporting before the next AGM on a new topic which required significant review and consideration by the business.

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## Voting Decision Elements

The following table details the specific considerations that we take into account when assessing resolutions.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Framing Question</th>
<th>Explanation</th>
<th>T. Rowe Price Perspective</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| 1. Does the resolution address an environmental or social issue that is material for this company? | ■ In our view, materiality is a key consideration because it is suboptimal to distract the company and its board with resolutions on issues that are not financially material.  
■ To determine materiality, we use frameworks specifically designed for that purpose: the SASB and our proprietary Responsible Investing Indicator Model (RIIM).  
If an issue to be brought before a shareholder meeting falls into a category deemed material by these frameworks, we are more likely to support it.                                                                                                                                                                                                 | If an issue to be brought before a shareholder meeting falls into a category deemed material by these frameworks, we are more likely to support it.                                                                                                                                               |
| 2. Who are the proponents of the resolution, and are our objectives aligned with theirs? | ■ It is not always possible to obtain the identity of the proponents of shareholder resolutions, but when it is disclosed, we believe it is an important consideration. Most shareholder resolutions are submitted out of a sincere desire to improve the company’s practices for the benefit of shareholders and other stakeholders.  
■ In some cases, however, shareholder resolutions are used as a tactic to bring public pressure onto a company as part of a larger dispute unrelated to the company’s long-term economic success.  
■ In other cases, shareholder resolutions are used with the aim of benefiting certain types of shareholders over others.  
If our objectives as long-term investors are compatible with the objectives of the proponents, we are more likely to support their proposals.                                                                                     | If our objectives as long-term investors are compatible with the objectives of the proponents, we are more likely to support their proposals.                                                                                                                                                     |
| 3. Is the proposal asking for new disclosure, additional disclosure, or specific action? | ■ Most proposals in our portfolios each year seek disclosure on a particular topic. For example, the proposal may ask the company to report on its human rights policies or political spending activities. The company may or may not already provide some level of disclosure on the subject.  
■ Some proposals go beyond disclosure and ask the company to take a specific operational decision, adopt a specific policy, add a board member or committee, close a business operation, or take similar explicit actions.  
■ Our view on these prescriptive proposals is that they usurp management’s responsibility to make operational decisions and the board’s responsibility to guide and oversee such decisions.  
T. Rowe Price is unlikely to support prescriptive resolutions of any kind.  
If a resolution seeks additional disclosure, we closely examine the extent of the company’s existing discussion on the topic. We support the resolutions in cases where we believe the additional disclosure would be useful in our investment process.  
If a resolution seeks disclosure on a material issue against which the company does not currently report, we are likely to support it.                                                                 | T. Rowe Price is unlikely to support prescriptive resolutions of any kind.  
If a resolution seeks additional disclosure, we closely examine the extent of the company’s existing discussion on the topic. We support the resolutions in cases where we believe the additional disclosure would be useful in our investment process.  
If a resolution seeks disclosure on a material issue against which the company does not currently report, we are likely to support it.                                                                                                                                 |
| 4. Are shareholders the optimal stakeholders to address the core issue that is the subject of the resolution? | ■ Some resolutions ask companies to address social or environmental concerns that are already subject to regulation.  
■ Some resolutions ask investors to impose company-level, private-market solutions to problems that are clearly better addressed by other stakeholders, including regulators, legislation, the courts, or communities. | If a proposal asks an individual issuer to adopt a standard that is higher than the regulatory requirement and peers’ practices, we will take potential competitive harm into consideration in our voting decision.  
If a proposal seeks to apply company-level solutions to a broad societal problem, and the company has little influence over the problem, we may deem the resolution to be poorly crafted or misdirected.                                                                 | If a proposal asks an individual issuer to adopt a standard that is higher than the regulatory requirement and peers’ practices, we will take potential competitive harm into consideration in our voting decision.  
If a proposal seeks to apply company-level solutions to a broad societal problem, and the company has little influence over the problem, we may deem the resolution to be poorly crafted or misdirected.                                                                 |
| 5. Are there any specific considerations given to climate-related resolutions? | A subset of proposals in the environmental category are specifically around limiting a company’s greenhouse gas emissions to meet the objectives of the Paris Climate Agreement.  
Adequate disclosure is the first step to assessing a company’s preparedness for the low-carbon transition. We support the TCFD, and we tend to support resolutions encouraging companies to disclose against this disclosure framework.  
Resolutions calling for the company to undertake specific actions, such as divesting from certain businesses, are likely to be deemed too prescriptive for us to support.                                                                 | Adequate disclosure is the first step to assessing a company’s preparedness for the low-carbon transition. We support the TCFD, and we tend to support resolutions encouraging companies to disclose against this disclosure framework.  
Resolutions calling for the company to undertake specific actions, such as divesting from certain businesses, are likely to be deemed too prescriptive for us to support.                                                                 |

For a detailed description of our voting decisions on shareholder proposals in this category, see our publication titled *For or Against: The Year in Shareholder Proposals*, available on [www.troweprice.com/esi](http://www.troweprice.com/esi).
Governance of Proxy Voting at T. Rowe Price

Fiduciary considerations
T. Rowe Price’s decisions with respect to proxy issues are made in light of the anticipated impact of the issue on the desirability of investing in the portfolio company. Proxies are voted solely in the interests of the client, T. Rowe Price Funds shareholders or, where employee benefit plan assets are involved, in the interests of plan participants and beneficiaries.

Proxy administration
The T. Rowe Price Environmental, Social and Governance Committee (“TRPA ESG Investing Committee”) develops our firm’s positions on all major proxy voting issues, creates guidelines, and oversees the voting process. The TRPA ESG Investing Committee, composed of portfolio managers, investment analysts, operations managers, and internal legal counsel, analyzes proxy policies based on whether they would adversely affect shareholders’ interests and make a company less attractive to own. In establishing our proxy policies each year, the Committee relies upon our own fundamental research, independent research provided by an outside proxy advisor, and information presented by company management and shareholder advocates.

Once the TRPA ESG Investing Committee establishes its recommendations, they are distributed to the firm’s portfolio managers as voting guidelines. Ultimately, the portfolio managers decide how to vote on the proxy proposals of companies in their portfolios. Because portfolio managers may have differences of opinion on portfolio companies and their unique governance issues, the T. Rowe Price Funds may cast different votes at the same shareholder meeting. When portfolio managers cast votes that are counter to the TRPA ESG Investing Committee’s guidelines, they are required to document their reasons in writing to the Committee. Annually, the Committee reviews T. Rowe Price’s proxy voting process, policies, and voting records.

T. Rowe Price has retained Institutional Shareholder Services (“ISS”), an expert in the proxy voting and corporate governance area, to provide proxy advisory and voting services. These services include custom vote recommendations, research, vote execution, and reporting. In order to reflect T. Rowe Price’s issue-by-issue voting guidelines as approved each year by the TRPA ESG Investing Committee, ISS maintains and implements custom voting policies for the T. Rowe Price Funds and other client accounts.

Monitoring and resolving potential conflicts of interest
The TRPA ESG Investing Committee is also responsible for monitoring and resolving possible conflicts between the interests of T. Rowe Price and those of its clients with respect to proxy voting. We have adopted safeguards to ensure that our proxy voting is not influenced by interests other than those of our fund shareholders and clients. While membership on the TRPA ESG Investing Committee is diverse, it does not include individuals whose primary duties relate to client relationship management, marketing, or sales.

Since our voting guidelines are predetermined by the TRPA ESG Investing Committee, application of the T. Rowe Price guidelines to vote clients’ proxies should in most instances adequately address any possible conflicts of interest. However, for proxy votes inconsistent with T. Rowe Price guidelines, the TRPA ESG Investing Committee reviews all such proxy votes in order to determine whether the portfolio manager’s voting rationale appears reasonable. The TRPA ESG Investing Committee also assesses whether certain business or other relationships between T. Rowe Price and a portfolio company could have influenced an inconsistent vote on that company’s proxy. Issues raising possible conflicts of interest are referred to designated senior members of the Committee for immediate resolution prior to the time T. Rowe Price casts its vote.

With respect to personal conflicts of interest, T. Rowe Price’s Code of Ethics requires all employees to avoid placing themselves in a compromising position where their interests may conflict with those of our clients and restricts their ability to engage in certain outside business activities. Portfolio managers or TRPA ESG Investing Committee members with a personal conflict of interest regarding a particular proxy vote must recuse themselves and not participate in the voting decisions with respect to that proxy.

Specific conflict-of-interest situations
Voting of T. Rowe Price Group, Inc. common stock by certain T. Rowe Price Index Funds will in all instances be cast in accordance with T. Rowe Price policy, and votes inconsistent with policy will not be permitted. In the event that there is no previously established guideline for a specific voting issue appearing on the T. Rowe Price Group proxy, the T. Rowe Price Funds will abstain on that voting item.

In addition, T. Rowe Price has voting authority for proxies of the holdings of certain T. Rowe Price Funds that invest in other T. Rowe Price Funds. In cases where the underlying fund of an investing T. Rowe Price Funds, including a fund-of-funds, holds a proxy vote, T. Rowe Price will mirror vote the fund shares held by the upper-tier fund in the same proportion as the votes cast by the shareholders of the underlying funds (other than the T. Rowe Price Reserve Investment Funds).
Securities lending and proxy voting

The T. Rowe Price Funds and our institutional clients may participate in securities lending programs to generate income. Generally, the voting rights pass with the securities on loan; however, lending agreements give the lender the right to terminate the loan and pull back the loaned shares provided sufficient notice is given to the custodian bank in advance of the applicable deadline.

T. Rowe Price’s policy is generally not to vote securities on loan unless we determine there is a material voting event that could affect the value of the loaned securities. In this event, we have the discretion to pull back the loaned securities in order to cast a vote at an upcoming shareholder meeting. A monthly monitoring process is in place to review securities on loan and how they may affect proxy voting.

Limitations on voting proxies of certain U.S. banks

T. Rowe Price has obtained relief from the U.S. Federal Reserve Board (the “FRB Relief”) which permits, subject to a number of conditions, T. Rowe Price to acquire in the aggregate on behalf of its clients, 10% or more of the total voting stock of a bank, bank holding company, savings and loan holding company or savings association (each a “Bank”), not to exceed a 15% aggregate beneficial ownership maximum in such Bank. One such condition affects the manner in which T. Rowe Price will vote its clients’ shares of a Bank in excess of 10% of the Bank’s total voting stock (“Excess Shares”). The FRB Relief requires that T. Rowe Price use its best efforts to vote the Excess Shares in the same proportion as all other shares voted, a practice generally referred to as “mirror voting,” or in the event that such efforts to mirror vote are unsuccessful, Excess Shares will not be voted. With respect to a shareholder vote for a Bank of which T. Rowe Price has aggregate beneficial ownership of greater than 10% on behalf of its clients, T. Rowe Price will determine which of its clients’ shares are Excess Shares on a pro rata basis across all of its clients’ portfolios for which T. Rowe Price has the power to vote proxies.

Global voting framework

T. Rowe Price applies a two-tier approach to determining and applying global proxy voting policies. The first tier establishes baseline policy guidelines for the most fundamental issues, which apply without regard to a company’s domicile. An example of such baseline policies would be the importance of having independent directors on a company’s Audit Committee. The second tier takes into account the various governance codes and norms in different regions, making allowances for local market practices as long as they do not conflict with the fundamental goal of good corporate governance. Our objective is to enhance shareholder value through the effective use of the shareholder franchise, recognizing that no single set of policies is appropriate for all markets.

Practicalities and costs involved with international investing may make it impossible at times, and at other times disadvantageous, to vote proxies in every instance. For example, we might refrain from voting if we or our agents are required to appear in person at a shareholder meeting or if the exercise of voting rights results in the imposition of trading restrictions.

A discussion of engagement

At T. Rowe Price, we believe it is our responsibility as an asset manager to safeguard our clients’ interests through active ownership, monitoring, and mutual engagement with the issuers of the securities we hold in our clients’ portfolios. We do not outsource any element of our engagement activity to outside parties. Thanks to the trust our investment clients have placed in us, T. Rowe Price is a significant investor for many of the world’s leading companies. This affords us, in most cases, access to company management teams and board members. We believe our responsibilities as diligent investors do not cease with the decision to purchase a security. We maintain regular dialogue with the managements of issuers represented across our portfolios. Where we find areas of concern, we make those concerns known to them.

Our engagements with company management on topics of an environmental, social, or governance nature are described in our Engagement Policy. For a copy of this publication, visit www.troweprice.com/esg.

Proxy vote disclosure

The T. Rowe Price Funds make broad disclosure of their proxy votes on www.troweprice.com and on the SEC’s Internet site at www.sec.gov. All funds, regardless of their fiscal years, must file with the SEC by August 31, their proxy voting records for the most recent 12-month period ended June 30.

Additional rights of shareholders

The scope of this document is limited to T. Rowe Price’s exercise of the voting rights that accompany our clients’ investments in equity securities. Shareholders are occasionally entitled to additional rights, such as dividend elections and rights offerings. These rights are evaluated and processed by our Corporate Actions group, which is part of our Investment Operations division.