

**2020 AGGREGATE PROXY VOTING SUMMARY  
(U.S. Mutual Funds)**

Environmental, Social, and Governance

# ESG

**In this report, we summarize our proxy voting record for the 12-month period ended June 30, 2020 (the “Reporting Period”). Our goal is to highlight some of the critical issues in corporate governance during the Reporting Period and offer insights into how we approach voting decisions in these important areas.**

This report is not an all-inclusive list of each proxy voted during the Reporting Period, but rather it is a summary of the year's most important themes. In conjunction with this report, we have filed with the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) and posted on [troweprice.com](http://troweprice.com) each T. Rowe Price Fund's votes on all proxy proposals voted during the period.

## OUR OBJECTIVE

### **Thoughtful Decisions Leading to Value Creation**

At T. Rowe Price, proxy voting is an integral part of our investment process and a critical component of the stewardship activities we carry out on behalf of our clients. We support actions that we believe will enhance the value of the companies in which we invest, and we oppose actions or policies we see as contrary to shareholders' interests.

We analyze proxy voting issues using a company-specific approach based on our investment process. Therefore, we do not shift responsibility for our voting decisions to outside parties, and our voting guidelines allow ample flexibility to account for company-specific circumstances. Ultimately, the portfolio managers of each T. Rowe Price Fund are responsible for voting the proxy proposals of companies in their portfolios.



The following table is a broad summary of some of our proxy voting patterns and results for the reporting period covering July 1, 2019 through June 30, 2020, across our global equity-focused mutual funds.

SUMMARY OF MAJOR PROPOSAL ITEMS		
July 1, 2019—June 30, 2020, Mutual Funds Only		
PROPOSAL	% VOTED WITH MANAGEMENT	% VOTED AGAINST MANAGEMENT
<b>I. Proposals Sponsored by Management</b>		
Add/amend antitakeover provisions	49%	51%
Reduce/repeal antitakeover provisions	97%	3%
Appoint or ratify auditors	99%	1%
Capital structure provisions	91%	9%
Compensation issues		
i. Director/auditor pay	95%	5%
ii. Employee stock purchase plans	93%	7%
iii. Executive plans	79%	21%
iv. Say on pay	87%	13%
Elect directors (uncontested)	92%	8%
Mergers and acquisitions	91%	9%
Routine operational provisions	92%	8%
Amend/enhance shareholder rights	96%	4%
<b>II. Proposals Sponsored by Shareholders</b>		
Remove antitakeover provisions	47%	53%
Amend compensation policies	82%	18%
Appoint an independent board chair	44%	56%
Amend/adopt shareholder rights	80%	20%
Environmental proposals	83%	17%
Social issues proposals	83%	17%
Political activity proposals	68%	32%
Anti-ESG proposals	100%	0%
Anti-nuclear proposals (Japan)	100%	0%
<b>III. Contested Elections</b>		
Elect directors in proxy contest	37%	63%
<b>IV. Totals</b>		
Total management proposals	91%	9%
Total shareholder proposals	83%	17%

## Themes from Vote Results

The categories above represent a subset of our total voting activity during the Reporting Period, but these are the most prevalent and significant voting issues. In the section below, we discuss some of these categories in detail.

## Election of Directors

At T. Rowe Price, we recognize that it is the board of directors' responsibility to develop and guide corporate strategy and oversee management's implementation of that strategy. We generally do not support shareholder-led initiatives that we believe may infringe upon the board's authority. However, one of the fundamental principles underlying our proxy voting guidelines is accountability. We believe directors are the designated representatives of shareholders' interests. Therefore, our voting reflects our assessment of how effectively they fulfill that duty.

In our global portfolios, we take a market-by-market approach to assessing board composition and independence, recognizing that regional corporate governance codes around the world apply different expectations. In the U.S., we generally support a company's nominees for director when at least a majority of the board's directors are independent and when those directors' performance in the prior year has not given us cause for concern. Where there is cause for concern, we vote against the reelection of that individual director, the members of a key board committee, or, in some cases, the entire board.


Examples of situations where we believe shareholders are best served by voting to remove directors include:

- maintaining an insufficient level of diversity at the board level;
- failing to remove a fellow director who received less than a majority of shareholder support in the prior year;
- neglecting to adopt a shareholder-proposed policy that was approved by majority vote in the prior year;
- adopting takeover defenses or bylaw changes that we believe put shareholders' interests at risk;
- maintaining significant outside business or family connections to the company while serving in key leadership positions on the board;
- promoting the decoupling of economic interests and voting rights in a company through the use of dual-class stock with superior voting rights for insiders, without adopting a reasonable sunset mechanism;
- failing to consistently attend scheduled board or committee meetings;
- implementing a policy or practice that we believe is a breach of basic standards of good corporate governance.

Elections of directors are by far the most common voting item on company proxies worldwide, representing 58% of our total number of voting decisions this year. Almost all these elections are uncontested, meaning there is only one nominee for each available board seat. This year, we supported 92% of the director candidates nominated by the boards of the companies in T. Rowe Price portfolios globally.

As in past years, T. Rowe Price voted consistently in favor of proposals to strengthen certain shareholder rights. One example is majority voting for the election of directors. We believe directors should relinquish their board seats if they are opposed by a majority of their shareholders, even in the case of uncontested elections.

Generally, we also support the notion that companies should offer shareholders certain safeguards, such as proxy access and the right to call special meetings. In the past three years, however, we have seen a sharp rise in the number of shareholder-led initiatives to ease the standards by which such safeguards can be used. When companies adopt acceptable standards of proxy access and special meetings, we do not support shareholders' efforts to revise them. This is the reason our overall support for proposals in the shareholder rights category has fallen.



**Elections of  
company directors  
represented 58%  
of our total voting  
activity this year.**

## Shareholder Activism

Investment strategies involving shareholder activism have had a notable impact in a number of markets over the past few years, especially in the U.S., Europe, and Japan. Year-to-date, activism campaigns have been notably quieter, which we presume is a result of meeting and travel constraints related to the pandemic.

Often, the presence of activist shareholders does not result in a voting event, as the company and activists negotiate some form of mutually agreeable outcome. In some cases, however, negotiations stall and investors face a contested board election—a choice between incumbent company directors and the activist's nominees. T. Rowe Price assesses each of these situations carefully in an effort to determine which set of directors is best suited to lead the company over the long term. Our voting record on contested elections reflects our case-by-case approach. Last year we supported incumbent management candidates in 56% of contests, this year that figure dropped to 37%.

A full discussion of our perspective on shareholder activism can be found [here](#).

## Executive Compensation


Annual advisory votes on executive compensation, the nonbinding resolutions known as "say on pay," are a common practice globally. As a result, executive compensation decisions remain a central point of focus for the dialogue that routinely takes place between companies and their shareholders. In our view, corporate disclosure in the annual proxy filings improves every year as board members endeavor to explain not only what they paid their executive teams, but why. In the past year, T. Rowe Price voted against the "say on pay" vote at 13% of companies.

Generally speaking, our portfolio managers are most likely to express concerns about a compensation program when they have observed a persistent gap between the performance of the business and executive compensation over a multiyear period. Other common reasons for our opposition to these resolutions are situations where: (a) the board uses special retention grants without sufficient justification, and (b) the use of equity for compensation is high but executives' ownership of the stock remains low.

For the 2021 proxy year, we are anticipating a notable increase in the complexity of our decisions around compensation. Due to the pandemic and the related economic disruption in many parts of the world, we expect many companies to fall short of the pre-determined objectives set out in 2018 and 2019, leading to forfeiture of awards that would have vested in 2020. Boards may decide to amend or waive these performance conditions out of concern for retaining executive talent, given the pandemic's impact on their business. This may be a reasonable path in some cases but, from our point of view, other factors must also be considered. Companies should be mindful of the overall experience of their relevant stakeholders when deciding to waive or amend their compensation programs. For example, we believe companies that reduced their work forces significantly or received government assistance due to the pandemic, should be particularly conservative regarding efforts to amend pay plans to benefit their executives.

## Broad-Based Equity Compensation Plans


T. Rowe Price believes that a company's incentive programs for executives, employees, and directors should be aligned with the long-term interests of shareholders. Under the right conditions, we believe that equity-based compensation plans can be an effective way to create that alignment. Ideally, we look for plans that provide incentives consistent with the company's stated strategic objectives. This year, we supported the adoption or amendment of such compensation plans approximately 79% of the time.



**We supported the adoption or amendment of 79% of compensation plans.**

For the 21% of compensation plans we did not support, our vote was usually driven by the presence of a practice that we felt undermined the link between executive pay and the company's performance such as:

- compensation plans that, in our view, provide disproportionate awards to a few senior executives;
- plans that have the potential to excessively dilute existing shareholders' stakes;
- plans with auto-renewing "evergreen" provisions; or
- equity plans that give boards the ability to reprice out-of-the-money stock options without shareholder approval.



## Mergers and Acquisitions

T. Rowe Price portfolio managers generally vote in favor of mergers and acquisitions after carefully considering whether our clients' portfolios would receive adequate compensation in exchange for their shares. In considering any merger or acquisition, we assess the value of our holdings in a long-term context and vote against transactions that, in our view, underestimate the true underlying value of our investment.

## Takeover Defenses

T. Rowe Price portfolio managers consistently vote to reduce or remove antitakeover devices in our portfolio companies. We oppose the introduction of shareholder rights plans (so-called "poison pills") because they can prevent an enterprise from realizing its full market value and create a conflict of interest between directors and the shareholders they represent. We routinely vote against directors who adopt poison pill defenses without subjecting them to shareholder approval. However, in the current environment, where the pandemic has disproportionately impacted certain industries, many companies believe their current valuation does not reflect their actual intrinsic value. To protect themselves against unfair bids from potential acquirors, some of these companies have adopted temporary poison pills. For the rest of 2020 and in 2021, T. Rowe Price will consider these unique circumstances before making any determination to oppose directors for this decision.

A positive development in the U.S. over the past several years has been a trend of companies dismantling their long-standing antitakeover provisions at the urging of their shareholders. When such provisions (for example, a supermajority vote requirement) are embedded in the company's charter, a shareholder vote is required in order to remove them. T. Rowe Price enthusiastically supports management efforts to remove takeover defenses.

## Separate Board Chair and CEO

In many markets, the most common board leadership structure has separate roles for the chair and the company's chief executive officer. Under the U.S. proxy rules, companies are required to discuss their leadership structure and the reasons that a particular arrangement (i.e., an independent board chair, a separate but non-independent chair, or a combined chair/CEO role) is the most appropriate one for the company. We consider the need for independent board leadership on a company-by-company basis. In many cases, we find that a designated lead director role provides adequate protection of shareholders' interests. In other situations, we conclude that shareholders' interests would be better served under an independent chair. This Reporting Period, T. Rowe Price voted in favor of shareholder proposals to appoint an independent board chair 56% of the time.

**We voted in favor of shareholder proposals to appoint an independent board chair 56% of the time.**

## Social, Environmental, and Political Proposals

In this report, we have broken down these votes into five sub-categories due to some unique patterns within the broader group of environmental, social, and political proposals. The sub-categories we have extracted for separate disclosure are:

■ **Political/lobbying proposals.** In 2020, the T. Rowe Price ESG Committee, which establishes and oversees our Proxy Voting Guidelines, made a change to our approach to politically oriented proposals in the U.S. Historically, we have usually deferred to management on these resolutions because we believe corporate participation in the political process, where allowed by law, is appropriate. However, recently we have observed a widening disconnect between what companies publicly disclose about their approach to environmental and governance matters and what their trade organizations represent on their behalf. To the extent that we find mismatches of this nature, or generally poor disclosure about the board's oversight of political activity, we have been supporting shareholder resolutions asking for more transparency on political spending and lobbying activities. In this Reporting Period, we supported 32% of these proposals, up from 5% last year.

■ **Environmental proposals.** As part of our normal ESG engagement program, we have been encouraging companies to improve their environmental disclosure. The current lack of standardization on environmental reporting makes it more difficult for us to analyze companies' environmental performance, and, as such, we specifically recommend the Sustainability Accounting Standards Board (SASB) and Task Force on Climate-Related Financial Disclosure (TCFD) reporting frameworks. While we support the aim of many environmental proposals to improve disclosure, we find that a significant number of them ask for non-standardized or ancillary disclosures. In these cases, we often find it difficult to support the shareholder proposal, but will use the opportunity to engage with the company on improving its environmental disclosure and recommend use of the SASB and TCFD reporting frameworks.

In our case-by-case analysis of environmental proposals, the current level of disclosure is our most important consideration, followed by factors such as the materiality of the specific environmental issue for the company in question; the disclosure framework being requested by the proponent; our prior engagement with the company on environmental matters; the recommendations of our Responsible Investment team; the identity of the proponents, if available, and their stated intentions; and the level of prescriptiveness embedded in the proposal. In this Reporting Period, T. Rowe Price supported 17% of environmental resolutions, up from 13% the year before.

■ **Social proposals.** This category contains a wide range of proposals on issues ranging from specific operational practices at companies to broader societal issues such as diversity. In 2021, as investors intensify our focus on racial inequality in the corporate world, we expect a large increase in the number of resolutions dealing with human capital management, diversity, and inclusive practices. Our approach to socially oriented resolutions is similar to the environmental category. We assess them on a case-by-case basis, taking into account the materiality of the issue being raised; the company's existing level of disclosure; the degree of prescriptiveness in the resolution; the views of our Responsible Investment team; the identity of the proponents, if available, and their stated intentions; and our engagement history with the company on the topic. In this Reporting Period, T. Rowe Price supported 17% of the proposals in this category, up from 9% last year. The types of proposals we support most often are around human capital management.

■ **Anti-ESG proposals.** Although small in number, there is a growing set of resolutions each year sponsored by proponents whose aim is to persuade companies to roll back environmental initiatives, curtail charitable giving, or de-emphasize diversity and inclusion. The objectives of these proposals are so distinct from the overall category of shareholder resolutions that we believe they need to be analyzed and reported separately. Anti-ESG proposals represented 4% of the broader category during this reporting period. T. Rowe Price did not support any of these.

For more information about our funds' proxy voting policies and procedures, you can call us at 1-800-225-5132 or visit the SEC's website, [sec.gov](http://sec.gov), to request a fund's Statement of Additional Information (SAI). The description of our proxy voting policies and procedures is also available on our website and can be found here, [troweprice.com](http://troweprice.com).

The annual proxy voting summary report as well as each fund's most recent annual proxy voting record is also available on our website and through the SEC's website.

■ **Anti-nuclear proposals.** Ever since the 2011 earthquake and subsequent nuclear accident in Fukushima, Japan, individual investors in this region have mounted a persistent campaign to get Japanese utilities to generate power from sources other than nuclear plants. Publicly traded Japanese utilities receive multiple resolutions of this nature every year. In total, these proposals represent 12.5% of the overall social, environmental, and political category. T. Rowe Price does not support any of these resolutions as they are extremely prescriptive in nature, asking companies to change their operations. Our view is that operational decisions are best left to the board.

## Conclusion

The detailed voting records of the T. Rowe Price Funds are made available on our web site each year on or around August 31, reflecting a Reporting Period of July 1 of the preceding year to June 30 of the current year. This report serves as a complement to these detailed voting records, rolling up our company-level voting records into key themes. In addition to this report, we provide a detailed overview of our voting activity each year in our ESG Annual Report.

For more information, visit [troweprice.com](http://troweprice.com).

This material is provided for informational purposes only and is not intended to be investment advice or a recommendation to take any particular investment action.

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**Past performance is not a reliable indicator of future performance.** All investments are subject to market risk, including the possible loss of principal. All charts and tables are shown for illustrative purposes only.

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